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5Editorial
 Norbert Eschborn
Society is based upon a moral consensus among its members. This consensus is 
characterized by common values and the understanding that moral anarchy destroys 
society and economy. Justice, fairness, honesty, integrity, and responsibility are 
the values that establish the backbone of a social community. Individuals and 
organizations are called upon to align their operations and decisions toward these 
values and to contribute to their stability. 
This also applies to the roles people play in business - and it particularly applies during 
times of economic crisis. The theory occasionally circulating that corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) could lose significance in face of the financial and economic 
crisis is misleading. The crisis can only be successfully mastered if our moral common 
sense and the desire and ability to cooperate are maintained to our mutual advantage.
Many companies worldwide have made Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) a 
central part of their business philosophy. It is the quality parameter of sustainable 
economic management. Responsible companies reduce their “ecological footprint,” 
respect labor and social standards, and engage in community projects.
CSR means voluntary commitments that go far beyond what is required by law. 
This is not only good for the environment and for society at large, but also for the 
companies themselves. It is in the interests of companies to save energy, for example, 
thus reducing their production costs, or to engage in community activities, thus 
convincing their staff that they work for a particularly active and responsible company. 
Economic success and sustainability belong together - today more than ever before. 
This issue of the KAS Journal on Contemporary Korean Affairs is dedicated to the 
analysis of CSR in Korea, its state and perspectives - a subject on which KAS has 
worked for many years already in close cooperation with our dedicated Korean 
partner organizations. The articles aim at presenting current matters of interest 
regarding CSR in this country where it seems to have not reached its full potential yet.
I should like to thank all authors for their important contributions and hope that 
this publication offers interesting insights into CSR in the Republic of Korea.

7The Level of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) in Korean Firms 
Kwon Sung-Sik
It is difficult to assess a firm’s level of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
because the scope of CSR is extensive and the results depend on the evaluation 
scope. Furthermore, CSR has different definitions across countries, history, 
cultures, religions, social customs, and economic conditions, and also varies 
according to the vision and unique specificity of individual firms. Therefore, it 
is practically impossible to come up with criteria that allow for the comparison 
of different CSR levels implemented by multiple firms. Moreover, even if 
criteria to evaluate the level of CSR exist, they are qualitative (human rights, 
environment, ethics) and not quantitative, thus raising a question over the 
objectivity of evaluation. Then, how can the level of CSR practiced by firms be 
evaluated. First, to identify an appropriate method for evaluating the level of 
CSR in Korea, we examined current CSR evaluation methods and awards in 
Korea and reflected upon an effective way to assess the CSR level. Building 
upon such reflection, we focused on the CSR practices of Korean firms today 
and proposed prospects for the future.
Introduction 
Since the 19th century, in a capitalist society, firms have evolved to employ a 
wide-range of business skills and means in order to attain traditional business 
objectives, i.e., profit-generation. And during this process, social issues such 
as environmental degradation, social polarization, and obesity occur. As a 
result, the public has criticized businesses for causing such social issues for 
their personal benefit, with businesses then responding and justifying their 
actions, which eventually gave birth to the concept of CSR or Corporate Social 
Responsibility.
The Level of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Korean Firms 
8
In particular, in the 1990s, a number of civic groups launched global boycott 
campaigns due to environmental, human rights, and corruption issues caused 
by multinational corporations, such as the Enron‧WorldCom scandals, for 
example, which has providing a warning that businesses disregarding CSR 
may be evicted from the market. As such, CSR is not an option but a necessity 
for business survival. This paper aims to examine the level of awareness and 
number of activities regarding CSR practices among Korean firms. To this 
end, it is essential to first discuss the definition CSR. 
1. What is CSR? 
When it comes to defining CSR, the most widely used concept is “The 
Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility” developed by Professor Archie 
B. Carroll (1991). Carroll believed that CSR includes the economic, legal, 
ethical, and philanthropic expectations that society has for corporations, and 
defined CSR into four major areas.
Table 1: Types of Corporate Social Responsibility
Type Description
Economic 
Responsibility
Responsibility of a corporation, as the most fundamental economic 
unit of society, to create products and services that society wants 
and sell them at a profit.
Legal 
Responsibility
Responsibility of a corporation to pursue its economic missions 
within the framework of the law. 
Ethical
Responsibility
Responsibility of a corporation to embraces fair and just business 
activities and practices that are expected by societal members, even 
though they are not codified into law.
Philanthropic
Responsibility
Responsibility of a corporation to utilize its resources and carry out 
appropriate social actions based on its discretionary or voluntary 
judgment or decision.
Kwon Sung-Sik
9
Image 1: The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility
Data: Carroll (1991). The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Towards the Moral Management 
of Organizational Stakeholder.
(자선적 책임: Philanthropic Responsibilities  윤리적 책임: Ethical Responsibilities  법적책임: Legal 
Responsibilities  경제적 책임:Economic Responsibilities)
In particular, Carroll regarded economic and legal responsibilities as “required” 
conditions for corporations, whereas ethical responsibilities were “expected” 
from businesses, and philanthropic responsibilities were “desired” from 
corporations in order for them to become good corporate citizens. 
However, this Pyramid may mislead us to think that the highest level of CSR 
by firms is to help the local community and underprivileged by donating 
proceeds or doing volunteer work, meaning that companies need to fulfil their 
philanthropic responsibilities to become a good corporate citizen.
Yet, the essence of Carroll’s pyramid model is that CSR starts from economic 
and legal responsibilities. In other words, a corporation merely promoting its 
CSR activities by boasting that it fulfils its philanthropic responsibilities without 
fulfilling its most fundamental economic legal responsibilities — for example, 
trying to become a good corporate citizen through donations or volunteering 
while engaged in malpractice such as tax evasion, fraud, embezzlement, window 
dressing, corruption, or unfair labour practices — is far from being true to the 
essence of CSR. 
Scholars other than Carroll based the concept of CSR differently based on their 
areas of interest, with these different perspectives being summarized Table 2.
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Table 2: Different Academic Perspectives on CSR
Views on CSR Scholar Description 
Stakeholder Maignan & Ferrell (2000)
The extent to which businesses meet the economic, legal, ethical, 
and discretionary responsibilities imposed on them by their 
stakeholders.
Stakeholder
Blomm & 
Gundlach 
(2001)
Obligations of the firm to its stakeholders, and these obligations 
go beyond legal requirements and the company’s duties to its 
shareholders, and fulfilment of these obligations is intended to 
minimize harm and maximize the long-run beneficial impact of 
the firm on society.
Stakeholder Sprinkle & Maines (2010)
CSR refers to diverse bushiness activities that are focused on 
the welfare of stakeholders.
Stakeholder Hasnas (2012)
Corporate managers should not have a collective fiduciary duty 
of the stakeholder group but the responsibility to make sure 
that all values created within the organization are distributed 
to all general stakeholders.
Stakeholder Brown & Forster (2012)
Corporations must use the concept of ‘justice’ and ‘complete 
right’, valuing stakeholders from an economic and moral 
standpoint for both corporate and social satisfaction.
Social 
Responsibility 
Browen 
(1953)
CSR refers to the obligations of businesses to pursue policies, 
to make decisions, or to follow lines of action that are 
desirable in terms of the objectives and values of society. 
Social 
Responsibility 
McGuire et 
al. (1988)
CSR refers to the obligations vis-a-vis the overall society, going 
beyond simple economic and legal obligations.
Social 
Responsibility 
Petkoski & 
Twose (2003)
CSR refers to the commitment of business to contribute to 
sustainable economic development, and working with employees, 
their families, and the local community and society at large to 
improve the quality of life, in ways that are both good for business 
and good for development.
Social 
Responsibility 
McWilliams 
& Siegel 
(2001)
CSR refers to the corporate activity needed to create a better 
society, going beyond fulfilling direct relationship of interests 
and regulatory conditions defined by law.
Social 
Responsibility 
Kitzmueller 
& Shimshack 
(2012)
CSR can be expressed as an observable and measurable behaviour 
or output, and Corporate Social Performance (CSP) exceeds 
levels set by obligatory regulations or standards enforced by law.
Ethics McFarland (1982)
CSR refers to corporations behaving based on moral, ethical, 
and economic values, recognizing the fact that individuals, 
organizations, and various social systems are interdependent.
Risk 
Management
Mohr et al. 
(2001)
CSR refers to behaviour aiming to maximize long-term positive 
effects while minimizing potential risks in advance.
Corporate 
Citizen
Marsden 
(2000)
A corporation is both a legal entity with both rights and 
obligations and a citizen constituting a member of the local 
community.
Corporate 
Citizen Thaler (2012)
A corporation has the responsibility to pursue profits while 
assuming its role as a good corporate citizen.
Source: KAIST Center for Corporate Social Responsibility (2006), Present and Future of Corporate 
Social Responsibility Practice in Korea; Huh Young-Do et al. (2012), Study on Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Local Economic & Social Development. Revised for Reference.
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As seen above, scholars including Carroll have expressed diverse views on 
CSR, with international organizations also adopting varying definitions of 
CSR. 
Table 3: Terminology and Definition of CSR among International Organizations 
International Organization Term Definition 
Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and 
Development (OECD)
CR
Corporate responsibility involves the search for an 
effective ‘fit’ between businesses and the societies 
in which they operate
International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) CR
The voluntary commitment by business to manage 
its activities in a responsible way
United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD)
CSR
Concept whereby enterprises integrate social and 
environmental concerns into their business policies 
and operations, with a view to improving their 
impact on society
World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD)
CSR
Continuing commitment by businesses to behave 
ethically and contribute to economic development 
while improving the quality of life of the workforce 
and their families, as well as that of the local 
community and society at large.
International Labour 
Organization (ILO) CSR
The way that enterprises consider the impact of 
their operations on society and CSR principles are 
integrated in both enterprises’ internal processes 
and interactions with stakeholders on a voluntary 
basis.
International Organization 
of Employers (IOE) CSR
Voluntary and positive activities carried out by 
corporations in various social, economic, and 
environmental fields, going beyond compliance 
with legal requirements.
International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) SR
Responsibility of an organization for the impact 
of its decisions and activities on society and the 
environment through transparent and ethical 
behaviour.
Source: Ko Dong-Soo (2006), Corporate Social Responsibility: Goal Discussions Trend & Our 
Response. Revised for Reference.
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To date, scholars and international organizations have had a difficult time coming 
up with a single definition of CSR because the scope of CSR is too broad. The 
core subjects of CSR proposed at ISO 260001 spanned from ‘governance’, 
‘human rights’, ‘labour practice’, ‘environment’, ‘fair management practice’, 
and ‘consumer issue’, to ‘local community engagement’ and ‘development’. 
As such, all business decisions made and business activities conducted seem 
to be in relation with CSR. Furthermore, such core CSR subjects can vary 
according to trends, places, time, and even the specificity of each firm and also 
its impact on society, making it even more difficult to adopt a single definition 
of CSR. Overall, since CSR is quite extensive in its scope, and at the same 
time the priorities of firms can change according to corporate specificity and 
conditions, it is extremely difficult to establish a concrete definition of CSR. 
Hence, it is natural that CSR has varying definitions according to areas of 
interest of scholars and the unique conditions of international organizations. 
After all, rather than adopting a single definition of CSR whose scope is quite 
comprehensive and flexible, businesses need to adopt a ‘practical approach’ 
to implement a personalized CSR practice tailored to the needs of their 
individual firm, since 100 different firms may require 100 different concepts 
of CSR. 
In this regard, GE, Nestle, and IBM include best practices defined by the 
priority of CSR activities, which factor in the views and characteristics of 
stakeholders and their impact on society to establish a sound CSR definition. 
Since 2007, GE has employed CSR strategies: 1) ‘Ecomagination’ initiative, 
which aims to address global environmental issues while seeking corporate 
growth, and 2) ‘Healthymagination’ to develop innovative medical products 
and provide better quality medical services, thereby reaching out to assist 
more people at an affordable price. As such, the company is striving to find 
a balance between how to co-exist with society while seeking sustainable 
growth. As another example, Nestle has a best practice for investing in 
technology transfers and irrigational facilities maintenance in local regions 
in order to improve the company product ingredients, and thus address 
local social issues, satisfy consumers with quality ingredients, while seeking 
corporate growth. IBM has also successfully implemented a CSR initiative 
1 ISO 26000: Global standard on “Social Responsibility” 
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called Smart Planet, which aims to build on its core technology of IT solutions 
in an attempt to address social issues by providing free-of-charge services to 
IT-marginalized regions and subsequently create a new customer base and 
market. 
2. How should we evaluate the level of CSR? 
As mentioned above, given the comprehensive and flexible characteristics 
of CSR, it is practically impossible to compare and evaluate the level of 
CSR based on a single criterion. Yet, numerous CSR awards and evaluation 
models based on differing criteria exist. First, we will examine awards that 
evaluate the level of CSR of Korean firms by organizing entities,2 and consider 
effective ways to evaluate the level of CSR based on the characteristics of said 
criteria. 
2.1. Media-hosted Awards 
Currently, the media operates the largest number of CSR-related awards. The 
media tends to distribute awards by using CSR-specialized organizations to 
assist their evaluation, or to jointly organize awards in conjunction with 
government sponsorships. 
2 Re-examined Issue Paper of The Federation of Korean Industries (2010), “CSR 
Evaluation System: True to its Role?” as of 2014
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Table 4: Major media-hosted awards as of 2014
Award Host & Organizer 
Year of 
Foundation 
(number of 
times awarded)
1 Chosun Ilbo Environmental Award Chosun Ilbo 1993 (21)
2
Quality Service No.1 by Women 
Consumers 
*Philanthropy Section
Yeoseong Shinmun 1999 (15)
3 Hankook Ethical Management Award 
Hankook Ilbo, New Industry 
Management Academy 2003 (10)
4 Philanthropic Business Award The Korea Economic Daily,Open Business Research Institute 2004 (10)
5 Best Workplace *Sustainability Section Magazine Hankyung 2007 (7)
6
Customer Inspired Management 
Award 
*Sustainability Section
The Korea Economic Daily, 
Korea Sustainability Management 
Evaluation
2007 (7)
7 The Republic of Korea Ethical Management Award Magazine Hankyung 2008 (7)
8 Korea Ethical Management Award
Hankook Ilbo, 
Ministry of Knowledge Economy, 
UN Global Compact
2008 (10)
9 Green Construction Award
Asia Today 
(sponsored by Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure and Transport)
2009 (4)
10
Kyunghyang Financial Education 
Award 
*Philanthropy Section
Kyunghyang Shinmun, Financial 
Supervisory Service 2009 (8)
11 Safe Management Award *Sustainability Section
Maeil Business Newspaper, Ministry 
of Employment and Labor 2009 (21) 
12
Creative Business Management 
Award of Korea
*Socially responsible management
Joongang Ilbo 2009 (5)
13 Forbes Philanthropic Award Forbes Korea, Korea Chamber Of Commerce And Industry, 2010 (4)
14 Korea Philanthropic Award Magazine Hankyung 2013 (1)
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Most awards are concentrated in the field of philanthropy, based on the size of 
donations or the number of volunteer activities, though awards on ethical 
management and green management are also worthy of particular attention. 
However, it is regretful that some awards hosted by the media fail to disclose 
the evaluation criteria, with some having no evaluation process, attesting to 
the fact CSR awards are sometimes used as a mere promotional tool. 
2.2. Government-hosted Awards (including para-government, local government)
Since the beginning of 2000, the Korean government has given awards for 
ethical business management as a way to promote CSR activities, and in the 
second half of 2000, additional awards were established that focus on green 
management. As of 2014, awards prescribed by Presidential Decree hold the 
highest prestige, which include the National Quality Management Convention 
Green Business Award, and the Sustainability Management Award. 
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Table 5: Government-hosted Awards (including para-government, local 
government)
Name of Award Host & Organizer
Year of 
Foundation 
(number of 
times awarded)
1
National Quality Management 
Convention
*Green Management
*Sustainable Management
Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Energy, 
Korea Standards Association
1975 (39)
2 Korea Game Award*Corporate Philanthropy Section
Ministry of Culture, Sports and 
Tourism, The Sports Chosun, 
The Electronic Times
1996 (17)
3 Labor Management Culture Award Ministry of Employment and Labour 1996 (18)
4 Neighbor-helping Men of Merit Ministry for Health, Welfare and Family Affairs 2000 (13)
5 National Environmental Management Award
Ministry of Environment, 
Maekyung Safety Environment 
Research Institute
2006 (8)
6 Corporate Image *Corporate Philanthropy Section Ulsan Ulju-gun 2008 (3)
7 Busan City corporate Philanthropy Award Busan City 2009 (5)
8 Recycling of Resources Leading Firm Award Korea Environment Corporation 2009 (8)
9 Green Management Award Ministry of Knowledge Economy, Institute for Industrial Policy 2010 (4)
10 Beloved Firm in Korea
Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Energy, Institute for Industrial 
Policy etc.
2013 (1)
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These government awards evaluate the level of CSR practice based on CSR-related 
evaluation indexes jointly developed by the government and CSR-specialized 
agencies. The following table lists the 5 major evaluation indexes.
Table 6: Major Evaluation Indexes
Name of 
Evaluation Index
Host & Organizer
(Year of Development)
Description 
1
 Korean 
Business 
Ethics IndeX 
(KoBEX)
Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Energy, 
Institute for 
Industrial 
Policy(2003)
Korea’s representative ethical management 
index, evaluates the ethical leadership of the 
CEO, role-model, equal employment at work, 
human resources development, health and 
safety, and is used as evaluation criteria for 
“The Most Beloved Firm in Korea” Award.
2 BSR Guidelines
Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Energy, 
Institute for 
Industrial 
Policy(2006)
Korea’s sustainable management index developed 
specifically for Korea based on GRI guidelines3.
3
HRD Korea 
Ethics 
inDEX 
(KEDEX)
HRDKorea(2008)
Qualitative, quantitative index developed to 
objectively measure the performance of ethical 
management progress of industrial complexes. 
Calculation based on 100 points, once per year.
4
Corporate 
Transparency 
Self-Diagnosi
s Model 
Anti-Corruption and 
Civil Rights 
Commission (2009)
Korea’s major corporate transparency evaluation 
index, consisting of disclosure transparency 
(25%), accounting transparency (25%), 
responsible management (20%), shareholders 
protection (15%), internal control (10%), ethical 
management, and social responsibility (5%). 
5
ISO26000 
Self-Diagnosi
s Check List
Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Energy 
Korea Agency for , 
Korean Agency for 
Technology and 
Standards(2010)
CSR evaluation index fully incorporating 
ISO26000, aiming to assess areas of the CSR 
implementation process (awareness on social 
responsibility, identification and engagement 
of stakeholder, priority setting, etc.) and 
performance (human rights, labour practice, 
environment, fair management practice, 
consumer issue, local community engagement 
and development). 
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Government awards are generally given based on highly credible criteria, 
ensuring greater professionalism and fairness compared to other award 
models. In particular, corporate legal responsibility, which is the most 
fundamental responsibility of CSR seen from the ‘Pyramid of Corporate 
Social Responsibility’ of Carroll (1991), is an element that the government 
used to screen most of the awards it hosts. Based on the award guidelines, 
the chances of firms trying winning these awards by externally assuming 
philanthropic responsibility while breaching legal requirements internally are 
minimal compared to awards hosted by other entities. However, limitations 
remain in that evaluation indexes have been focused on ethical management, 
except for the ‘ISO26000 self-diagnosis checklist’. In order to incorporate 
more a comprehensive CSR, it seems necessary to add more evaluation items 
related to economic responsibility — in addition to ethical responsibility — 
which means that corporations, as the basic units of society, must create 
products and services that society needs and sell them at a profit (Carroll, 
1991). Moreover, how to better screen the non-compliance of laws and 
regulations of awarded firms and how to objectively evaluate corporate 
governance and CSR implementation processes remains as tasks to be 
undertaken. 
2.3. Awards Operated by Industry Groups and Associations
CSR awards from industry associations exist, which are based on industry-specific 
characteristics. These awards excel in effectively considering the flexible 
characteristics of CSR, and how to apply industry-specific characteristics in 
the evaluations. However, limitations include the fact that most of these 
awards are focused on one element of CSR, based on the industry-specific and 
associations’ characteristics. 
3 GRI Guideline: Sustainability reporting guidelines developed by Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI), whichis referenced by more than 90% of global firms reporting on 
their sustainable performance. 
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Table 7: Awards Operated by Industry Groups and Associations
Name of Award Sponsor & Organizer
Year of 
Foundation 
(number of 
times awarded)
1 Labor Management Cooperation Award Korea Employers Federation 1989 (25)
2 Best Company Chosen by Women Consumers Award
Korean Women Entrepreneurs 
Association Korea Business Women’s 
Federation
1998 (16)
3 Seoul Social Welfare Convention Seoul Council on Social Welfare 1999 (14)
4 Mecenat Award Korea Mecenat Association 2000 (14)
5 Gratitude Award *Ethical Management Section Korea Listed Companies Association 2000 (15)
6 Corporate Governance Award Korea Exchange, Korea Corporate Governance Service 2001 (13)
7 LOHAS Management Award * Sustainability Korea Green Foundation 2004 (6)
8 Transparent Management Award
Organized by five leading economic 
organizations in Korea, Korea 
Accounting Information Association 
2005 (9)
9 Web Award Korea *Corporate Philanthropy Section Web Award Secretariat 2005 (10)
10
Small and Medium Enterprise 
Environmental Management 
Support Project Award
Korea Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, Institute of Corporate 
Sustainability Management, HSBC
2006 ( )
11 Best Social Enterprise Award Work Together Foundation 2006 (1)
12 ROK KOSDAQ Award *Corporate Philanthropy Section KOSDAQ Association 2006 (6)
13 Good Compliance Korea Exchange(KRX) 2007 ( )
14 ROK Health Industry Award *Corporate Philanthropy Section
Health Industries CEO Summit, 
Korea Health Industry Development 
Institute, Health Insurance Review 
& Assessment Service
2007 (7)
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2.4. Awards Operated by Professional Evaluation Agencies
Table 8: Major awards operated by CSR-specialized evaluation agencies
Name of Award Host & Organizer 
Year of 
Foundation 
(number of 
times awarded)
1 Corporate Governance Evaluation Korea Corporate Governance Service 2003 (9)
2 Respected Company Award Korean Management Association Consulting(KMAC) 2004 (10)
3 Korea Sustainability Conference Korea Standards Association (KSA) 2008 (6)
4
CITI-KOSMI 
Women Entrepreneurs Award 
*Corporate Philanthropy Section
Korea Small Business Institute, Korea 
CITI Bank 2008 (6)
5 DJSI Korea No.1 Company Award Korea Productivity Center(KPC) 2009 (5)
6 Global Standard Management Awards 
Korea Management Association 
Registration (KMAR) 2011 (3)
These awards are generally given based on criteria jointly developed by 
CSR-specialized agencies, in conjunction with an outside CSR advisory group 
or overseas CSR-specialized agency, and the evaluation criteria are as follows.
Table 9: Evaluation Criteria
Name of Evaluation 
Index
Sponsor & 
Organizer
(Year of 
Development)
Description 
1
Korea Exchange 
SRI Index
(KRX SRI)
Korea 
Corporate 
Governance 
Service(2009)
Stock index reflecting the evaluation results of the 
Korea Corporate Governance Service after assessing 
non-financial elements having an impact on the 
sustainability of listed companies in terms of corporate 
governance, and social and environmental elements.
2
Dow Jones 
Sustainability 
Index
(DJSI Korea)
Korea 
Productivity 
Center (2009)
Korea Productivity Center evaluates non-financial 
elements of Korean firms together with Dow 
Jones and Swiss SAM to incorporate firms above 
a certain level into DJSJ Korea. 
3
Republic of Korea 
Sustainability 
Index
(KSI) 
Korea 
Standards 
Association 
(2009)
Experts and stakeholders evaluate the responsiveness 
of firms to sustainability trends and impacts based 
on ISO 26000 (ISO 26000 7 core subjects).
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As such, professional CSR agencies try to cover all areas of CSR based on 
systematic evaluation criteria, compared to other CSR awards, and in particular 
they adopt a multi-faceted approach (media survey, external specialist pool, 
stakeholder survey, etc.) to assess the non-financial elements of firms. However, 
consulting agencies offering CSR consulting service to firms also evaluate the 
CSR level of these firms, which poses a risk of having a biased evaluation. 
Ideally, this aspect needs to be further improved.
2.5. Awards Operated by Academia
CSR awards managed by academic societies are as follows. They play a 
significant role in setting the theoretical context for CSR. 
Table 10: CSR awards managed by academic societies
Name of Award Sponsor & Organization 
Year of 
Foundation 
(number of 
times awarded)
1 Korea Marketing Frontier Award*Corporate Philanthropy Section Korea Marketing Associations 1993 (21)
2 Yonsei College of Business Administration Corporate Ethics Award
Yonsei University College 
of Business Administration 1996 (12)
3 Ethical Management Award Korean Academic Business Ethic 2003 (21)
2.6. Awards Managed by Civic Groups 
Furthermore, civic groups are also crucial for supervising and further promoting 
the CSR activities of firms. 
Table 11: Awards Managed by Civic Groups
Name of Award Host & Organizer
Year of 
Foundation 
(number of 
times awarded)
1 Economic Justice Corporate Award 
Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice, 
Korea Economic Justice Institute 1990 (22)
2 Best Foreign Corporation Award Korea Economic Justice Institute 2001 (9)
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The analysis of methods for evaluating the level of CSR among Korean firms 
based on the aforementioned awards and evaluation models in Korea indicate 
that, in general, the majority of evaluation methods focus on corporate 
philanthropy assessed bases on the amount of money donated or the number 
of volunteer activities. Next in line were awards on ethical management, which 
factor in elements in the areas of corporate ethical responsibility such as equal 
employment, health and safety, and accounting transparency, followed by 
awards on green management that include the areas of energy efficiency, 
climate change mitigation, biodiversity, etc. 
Recently, awards focusing on specific elements in line with current social trends, 
such as ‘Leading Firm in Job Creation’, and ‘Leading Firm in Gender Equality’ 
have also been presented. This is probably because it is more realistically feasible 
to evaluate specific elements of CSR rather than to conduct an overall assessment 
of CSR based on one single criterion since, as aforementioned, CSR is extensive 
in its scope and places different priorities according to the specific conditions 
faced by firms. 
Despite such facts, evaluation models and awards that assess integral parts of 
CSR still exist. Major examples include the ‘National Quality Management 
Convention’s Sustainability Award’ sponsored by the Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Energy, ‘Korea’s Beloved Company Award’ and ‘Respected 
Company Award’ by Korean Management Association Consulting (KMAC), 
Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) of the Korea Productivity Center (KPC), 
and Korean Sustainability Index (KSI) of the Korean Standards Association 
(KSA). These evaluation models assess the performance of the overall CSR 
elements through different methods, and the majority of the host institutions 
use official documents or sustainability reports submitted by businesses as 
source data for the evaluation. However, since sustainability reports undergo 
a 3rd party audit, they help to ensure a larger degree of objectivity in the report, 
whereas it is very difficult to assess the authenticity of official documents, 
unless they are of special consideration. Moreover, other than KSA’s KSI, 
errors can be made when standardized evaluation criteria are applied to 
compare and analyse different firms at the same level, without reflecting the 
company-specific CSR characteristics. Such failure may then lead firms to 
adapt their management process to the evaluation criteria or the checklist, and 
thus opt for ‘Checklist-Management’, disregarding the strategic activity of 
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defining the CSR concepts and their priority.
In other words, an objective CSR evaluation is practically impossible. However, 
evaluations should not be overlooked in the CSR implementation process 
because they help the improve CSR practices in firms. Therefore, it is posited 
here that two significant elements are required in order to evaluate the CSR 
level of firms. 
First, before evaluating the performance of CSR activities, it is important to 
evaluate the concept and process of CSR pursuing firms. It is essential to identify 
who the core stakeholders are and what their expectations and understanding 
are. Then, it is crucial to evaluate the positive and negative impacts of the 
corporate business model on society and the environment and to then seek 
solutions that minimize the negative impacts and maximize the positive 
impacts. Lastly, it is essential to determine whether or not firms are defining 
priorities by analysing the competitiveness of their CSR activities based on 
their internal core capacity. 
Second, both quantitative and qualitative methods must be employed in 
order to assess how corporations manage the CSR activities. To this end, it 
is crucial to receive performance feedback by communicating with not only 
CSR activity-specific experts but also different relevant stakeholders. 
The KSI model run by the KSA is a CSR evaluation model developed based 
on these two elements, which therefore effectively embodies the true essence 
of CSR. However, despite such guidelines, it is not practically feasible for 
corporations to identify and communicate with all stakeholders during the 
evaluation process. 
3. What is the level of CSR of Korean Firms? 
In 2013, the Social Enterprise Research Institute and the East Asia Institute 
conducted a national survey that looked at the major CSR dilemmas of Korean 
firms. The following four dilemmas were selected as the final concerns.
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First, despite the increased spending on CSR activities by a greater number of 
large corporations, public distrust of large corporations continues to grow. 
This distrust stems from the fact that, as aforementioned, most companies 
misinterpret the beginning of CSR to be a donation or volunteer activity. In 
order to dispel the distrust vis-a-vis large corporations, it is essential to 
implement CSR activities aiming to uproot tax evasion, embezzlement, fraud, 
window dressing, corruption, and unfair labour practices. And the process of 
implementing such initiatives should be disclosed to the public through 
communication with stakeholders. Indeed, donations and volunteer activities 
without such further processes will only have negative effects since they will 
be regarded as a mere CSR show that is being put up by firms. 
Second, there is need to improve public opinion in order to strengthen CSR 
regulations, which is linked to the first dilemma. The public is aware that 
donations and volunteer work are important, but it wants corporations to be 
more keen to fundamental issues such as human rights and the environment, 
and if possible, to legally regulate these elements. 
Third, there is an issue pertaining to double-minded consumers. The public 
calls for stronger CSR implementation by businesses, which is evidenced by 
survey results that reveal 77% of respondents “are willing to pay more for 
products coming from corporations demonstrating social and environmental 
responsibility for the next generation.” However, in reality, consumers tend to 
act in an opposite way. The fact is that stock prices or sales of firms unfairly 
treating their companies or violating the human rights of employees usually 
only decrease for one or two months and then pick back up; Korean consumers 
tend to be relatively indifferent regarding CSR issues. Under such circumstances, 
businesses will never give a serious consideration to CSR first. 
Fourth, there is no channel to communicate CSR activities. Today, some 100 
CSR reports are published each year by Korea’s leading corporations and 
public agencies; however, the majority of the public is not aware of such 
reports, and thus information pertaining to CSR is mostly obtained from the 
media. Currently, there are only a few companies committed to having two-way 
communications of CSR activities, but the bigger issue is that the public does 
not proactively wish to obtain CSR-related information.
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Consequently, the level of CSR practiced by Korean firms remains very low. 
The CSR International Conference 2014 survey findings confirm that many 
corporations perceive CSR as a mere promotional activity to enhance their 
corporate image. Similarly, the KSI survey results conducted during the past 5 
years reveal that the CSR level score of Korea is 50 points (out of 100 points). 
However, it should be noted that corporations alone are not to blame as 
consumers need to place more pressure on corporations to promote CSR. 
Conclusion
An American CSR evaluation expert, Jason Saul, argued in his publication 
‘CSR 3.0’ that only corporations considering CSR as a business opportunity will 
manage to co-exist with society and become future leaders. He emphasized 
that the CSR 3.0 era of seeking business opportunities while addressing social 
issues has arrived, which goes beyond ‘CSR 1.0’ in terms of providing mere 
charity and donations, and ‘CSR 2.0’ of complying with human rights and 
environmental legal regulations. However, it is posited here that it is not a true 
CSR to completely ignore the CSR 2.0 elements, with a view to rush into CSR 
3.0. At the same time, CSR 1.0 should not be regarded as the starting line or 
prerequisite for ushering in the age of CSR 3.0. A genuine commitment to 
CSR is about fulfilling economic and legal responsibilities first. Corporations 
can then consider their impact on society to apply a strategic CSR policy to 
create business opportunities or CSR for social innovation. When defining the 
priorities of true CSR activities based Jason Saul’s criteria, implementing CSR 
2.0 to fulfil legal requirements for human rights and environment concerns 
would be the first and foremost priority for businesses. Idealistically, the next 
step should to apply strategic CSR policies to create business opportunities by 
considering the corporate impact on society and then finally the CSR 1.0 
policies of charity and donation. The recent Sewol ferry disaster in Korea has 
profoundly taught us what kind of disaster is in store for society if firms ignore 
the basics of CSR. In this regard, we cannot help but think once again about 
the importance of CSR policies. Until today, we may have taken for granted that 
firms had no choice but to adopt CSR practices to ensure their sustainability. 
However, it should not be neglected that companies have a minimal responsibility 
to fulfil as a member of society; such a perspective is the first step towards 
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CSR implementation. Without such a sincere commitment, strategic CSR or 
CSV4 would only be superficial. Moreover, before coercing businesses to change 
their perspectives, consumers need to first improve their awareness by adopting 
ethical consumption5 and ‘Socially Responsible Investment’6 practices. 
4 Creating Shared Value (CSV): A term coined by Michael Porter and Mark Kramer, 
referring to using CSR as a source to secure innovation and competitive advantage. 
5 Ethical Consumption: Consumer movement including the fair trade movement, which 
is about not purchasing anti-environment, human, animal products and purchasing 
ethical products, even if the price is higher. 
6 Socially Responsible Investment: Investing from a long-term perspective by considering 
corporations’ financial aspects as well as non-financial aspects in an environmental, 
social, and governance context. 
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Sustainability Reporting Trend in Korea
Sung Jin-Young
1. Introduction 
As demand for the disclosure of corporate social responsibility performances 
and multiple-stakeholder communications surrounding business issues continues 
to grow, the number of firms implementing sustainability reporting is increasing 
accordingly. Ever since the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(WCED) defined the concept of “Sustainable Development” in its report “Our 
Common Future” published in 1987, global leading firms have taken the lead in 
issuing “Environmental Reports,” disclosing their environmental management 
practices and accomplishments. In 1995, in his publication “SustainAbility,” 
John Elkington further divided sustainable development into the “Triple Bottom 
Line (TBL)” of economic, environmental, and social agendas, and since then 
businesses began to release “Sustainability Reports” that include not only their 
environmental but also their economic and social achievements. 
Korea has had a relatively short history of sustainability reporting. Korean 
companies developed a growing interest in sustainable development since the 
Rio Summit in 1992, and in 1995, the top steelmaker POSCO was the first in 
Korea to publish its “Environmental Report.” Following this report, Kia Motors 
released an “Environmental/Social Report” in 2003, and Samsung SDI, 
Hyundai Motors, and DowCorning Korea issued reports entitled “Sustainability 
Report,” thus leading the sustainability reporting trend in Korea. In the beginning, 
sustainability reporting was focused on large conglomerates having abundant 
human and financial capital, whereas today, sustainability reporting attracts 
expanded interest from public agencies, SMEs, and NGOs as well. 
This paper aims to analyze the sustainability reports released in Korea and to 
then review the current trends of sustainability reporting in Korea, including 
the publication state of sustainability reports, use of global guidelines and 
norms (GRI guidelines, ISO26000, UNGC), implementation of integrated 
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reporting, third-party assurances, etc. Moreover, this paper reviews feedback 
from sustainability report readers in order to assess the awareness of sustainability 
reporting by Korean readers, while also looking at the future prospects of 
sustainability reporting in Korea. 
2. Trends for Sustainability Reporting 
1) Reporting Terminology
In the sustainability management reports disclosed by Korean and global firms, 
terminology used for their reporting varies from “sustainability reporting,” 
“corporate social responsibility report” to “corporate citizenship report.” Korean 
firms seem to prefer the term “sustainability,” which relates to sustainable 
development rather than “responsibility,” which is suggestive of obligations 
and burdens to fulfill. An analysis of 115 sustainability reports released in 2013 
suggested that 97 companies used the term “Sustainability Report” (84.3%), 
followed by “Corporate Social Responsibility Report”(7.8%) .
Table 1: Number of Sustainability Reports Published by Title
Terminology Number of Publications Ratio
Sustainability Report 97 84.3%
Corporate Social Responsibility Report 9 7.8%
Integrated Report 7 6.1%
Corporate Citizenship Report 1 0.9%
Report 1 0.9%
Total 115 100%
2) Korean and Global Reporting Guidelines 
As there is no legal requirement for sustainability reporting, Korea does 
not have any standardized reporting guidelines regarding the report content 
or format. Since Korean firms tend to prefer universally applicable global 
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standards, the majority report on their sustainability activities based on the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines, which are the most widely 
recognized guidelines. A study of KPMG International (2013) revealed that of 
41 countries worldwide, Korea had the highest uptake of GRI guidelines, 
which seems to attest to the high confidence that Korean firms have in global 
guidelines. 
Among the sustainability reports released in 2013, 108 reports adopted GRI 
guidelines (93.9%), while others were based on internal guidelines, Korean 
guidelines, and other guidelines.1 In 2013, the percentage of firms having 
implemented sustainability reporting based on GRI G3.1 was the highest at 
83.5%; however, since the release of GRI G4 guidelines in May 2013, the 
number of companies using G4 guidelines is also increasing.2
Many Korean firms report on their sustainability operations by adopting GRI 
guidelines, as well as ISO26000 and UNGC. To date, 72 sustainability reports 
were based on ISO 26000, global CSR standard (62.6%), and 54 companies 
released reports aligning to the 10 major principles and 4 major areas of 
human rights, labor, environment, and anti-corruption (47%). It appears that 
the reporting firms were making efforts to draft credible reports based on 
global norms by using a correlation table between the GRI and ISO 26000 
indices and preparing independent UNGC implementation reports (CoP). 
1 8 reports applied the Korea’s business sustainability reporting guidelines (B.E.S.T 
sustainability Reporting Guidelines), 6 implemented the International Integrated 
Reporting Council (IIRC) guidelines, 2 adopted Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition 
(EICC) guidelines, and 1 applied IPIECA/API sustainability reporting guidelines from 
the petroleum industry. 
2 As of the end of May 2014, a total of 5 companies produced sustainability reports based 
on GRI G4. In 2013, the Korea Mine Reclamation Corporation was the first to report 
its sustainability performance based on GRI G4, followed by Yuhan Kimberly. In 
2014, Hyundai Motors, Kia Motors, and POSCO produced sustainability reports based 
on G4 guidelines. 
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Table 2: Number of Sustainability Reports Published in 2013 based on 
Korean and Global Guidelines
Type Number of Reports
GRI Guideline
G3.1 96
G3 9
Non-GRI 7
G4 2
G3.1 and G4 index partially applied 1
ISO 26000 72
UN Global Compact 54
Other guidelines 19
3) Integrated Reporting 
Firms producing Integrated Reports incorporating both financial and non-
financial results are also emerging in Korea, and there is a growing move in 
listed companies to release integrated reports. In 2011, Hyundai Engineering 
& Construction was the first in Korea to take part in a pilot program using 
integrated reporting, led by the International Integrated Reporting Committee 
(IIRC), to produce a sustainability report in an integrated reporting format, 
and in 2013 SK Telecom released an integrated report entitled “Integrated 
Sustainability Report.” 
In 2013, other companies also implemented integrated reporting: 8 companies 
published reports entitled “Integrated Report,” representing 7% of all reports, 
and 6 out of 9 companies explicitly mentioned adoption of IIRC guidelines 
in their reports. However, there were many cases in which the supposedly 
integrated report was a mere combination of a sustainability management 
report and an annual report, without fully providing an integrated report by 
the firms in question. Therefore, a common belief is that it is too premature to 
shift to full implementation of integrated reporting in Korea. 
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4) Assurance of Report 
Firms reporting on their sustainability activities have typically had their reports 
assured via internal assurance, expert assurance, or third party assurance in order 
to gain credibility from their stakeholders and to enhance the perceived quality 
of their reports. Since most countries, excluding few such as France and South 
Africa, do not legally require report assurance, slightly more than 20% of reports 
released worldwide undergo this type of assurance (CorporateRegister.com, 2013). 
Conversely, Korean companies seem to place more importance on the credibility 
of reports. Among the 115 reports published in 2013, 96 companies conducted 
an independent external assurance, representing 83.5% of all reports produced. 
In general, external assurance is carried out by accountancy organizations, 
engineering firms, or small consultancy/boutique firms. In 2013, a total of 22 
independent organizations engaged in verifying sustainability reports, and 
contrary to global statistics showing that accountancy organizations are leading 
the assurance market; most reports in Korea were assured by specialized 
assurance organizations.3 Out of the 115 reports published in 2013, 58 were 
assured by specialized assurance organizations (60.4%), followed by engineering 
firms and certification organizations (25.0%), and accountancy organizations 
(14.6%). 
Table 3: Sustainability Assurance Providers in Korea 
Organization Type Organization Name Number of Reports Ratio
Accountancy 
Organizations KPMG, Deloitte, PwC, E&Y 14 14.6%
Engineering Firms DNV, LRQA 24 25.0%
Specialized 
Assurance 
Organizations 
Korea Standards Association (KSA), Korea 
Productivity Center (KPC), The Institute for 
Industrial Policy Studies (IPS), and other 13 
organizations 
58 60.4%
Total 96 100.0%
3 According to a CorporateRegister.com (2013) study, the 4 major accountancy organizations 
assured 51% of the overall reports, followed by 15% by consultancy boutique/firms, 
7% by other institutions, and 27% by certification organizations. 
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AA1000AS (Assurance Standard) was developed by a company called Account-
ability with a Goal to assure the credibility, excellence, fundamental process, 
and system of sustainability reports, and has been the most commonly used, 
internationally-applied norm for performing assurance on sustainability reports. 
An analysis of “third-party assurance opinions” of sustainability reports in Korea 
has revealed that 81 reports were assured based on AA1000AS, accounting for 
84.4% of all externally assured reports, and that assurance opinions were 
drafted based on the three principles of AA1000AS (inclusivity, materiality, 
and responsiveness) and attached to the reports. 
3. Key Statistics on Sustainability Report 
1) Target and Methodology 
The Korea Standards Association (2013) examined the type of companies and 
reporting frequency of the 115 reports published in 2013 as a sample base. 
Given that sustainability reports used varying reporting terminology, all 
reports, if incorporating the three major pillars (economic, environment, and 
social achievement) of sustainable management, were included in the study. 
Environmental reports, the UNGC implementation report (Commitment of 
Progress, CoP), and annual reports were excluded from the assessment.
Some companies, with a goal to report on their sustainability achievement of 
2012, published reports entitled “Sustainability Management Report 2012,” 
whereas others published “Sustainability Management Report 2013” based on 
the actual publication year. This study included all reports released in 2013 
based on the publication year. Moreover, to identify the different types and 
characteristics of reporting companies, a classification is shown in [Table 4] 
below. 
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Table 4: Organization Classification 
Type Sub-type Description
Company 
Listed company 1,832 companies listed on Korea Exchange (KRX)4 
Unlisted company Companies excluding listed companies 
NGO Other companies (NPO, social enterprises included)
Public 
Agency5
Public Corporation
30 agencies designated by the Minister of Strategy 
and Finance among public agencies with 50 or more 
employees, whose per se income is 1/2 or more than 
the total income
Para-Governmental 
agency 
87 agencies designated by the Minister of Strategy and 
Finance among public agencies that are not public 
corporations with 50 or more employees 
Other public agency 178 public agencies that are neither public corporations nor para-governmental agencies 
Local government 
and other agency 
Other public agencies not among 295 designated public 
agencies 
2) Sustainability Reporting Trend for Private Firms in Korea 
In 2013, a total of 78 sustainability reports by private firms were released in 
Korea, revealing a higher percentage of listed companies compared to unlisted 
companies. A total of 59 listed companies reported on their suitability 
performance (3.2% of all listed companies), showing a low reporting performance 
by listed companies; 16 unlisted companies produced sustainability reports, 
and 3 NGOs including environmental foundation reported on their sustainability 
efforts. 
4 As of January 27, 2014 from the Korea Exchange Listing Disclosure System (http:// 
www.krx.co.kr).
5 295 institutions established and run by government investment, financing, or funding 
and designated by the Minister of Strategy and Finance pursuant to Article 4.1 of the 
Act on the Management of Public agencies (as of 2013).
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3) Sustainability Reporting State for Public Agencies in Korea 
In Korea, 32 public agencies released sustainability reports in 2013, accounting 
for 10.8% of all public agencies, indicating a relatively lower reporting ratio 
for public agencies. By public agency type, 15 out of 30 public corporations 
implemented sustainability reporting (50.0%), followed by 14 out of 87 para-
governmental agencies (16.1%), and only 3 out of 178 other public agencies 
(1.7%). The number of sustainability reports produced by local governments 
such as Incheon Metropolitan City and other agencies was 4.
In rank order, the reporting trend for relevant ministries found that 42.9% of 
public agencies under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport 
released sustainability reports, followed by agencies under the Financial Services 
Commission (33.3%), the Ministry of Environment (25.0%), Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Energy (24.4%), Ministry of Maritime Affairs & Fisheries (14.3%), 
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (11.1%), Ministry of Employment 
and Labor (8.3%), Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (6.1%), Ministry 
of Health and Welfare (5.6%), Ministry of Education (4.8%), and Ministry of 
Science, ICT and Future Planning (2.6%). 
Table 5: Sustainability Reporting State by Private Companies and Public 
Agencies in 2013 
Type Sub-type Number of Organizations
Private Company
Listed company (1,832) 59
Unlisted company 16
NGO 3
Private Company Sub-total 78
Public Agency
Public corporation (30) 15
Para-governmental agency (87) 14
Other public agency (178) 3
Local government & Other agencies 4
Public Agency Sub-total 36
Total 114
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4) Sustainability Reporting Frequency
In Korea 92 companies have released sustainability reports on a yearly basis 
(80.7%), with 10 produced bi-annually (8.8%), and 2 companies tri-annually 
(1.8%). Moreover, 3 companies, including CJ Cheiljedang, reported on their 
sustainability performance on an irregular basis, and 7 companies that published 
sustainability reports for the first time in 2013 did not report on their reporting 
frequency. 
5) Sustainability Reporting Trend 
During the decade from 2003 to 2013, a total of 195 organizations released 
sustainability reports at least once, with a total of 644 reports being published 
to date. There are a number of key characteristics to consider when considering 
the sustainability reporting trend in Korea. 
First, compared to the relatively low level of awareness on sustainability 
management, the release of relevant reports has rapidly expanded. According 
to reporting statistics based on the publication year of 2013, a total of 114 
companies produced sustainability reports, which is a 38-fold increase compared 
that in 2003. However, the number of companies newly releasing reports has 
continued to decrease from 2010
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Image 1: Sustainability Reporting Implementation Trend among Companies 
(Agencies) in Korea
*발행기업(기관)수: No. of Publication Company (Agency); 발간연도: Publication Year: 
최초발간: Initial Publication; 누전발간: Accumulated Publication (initial +twice or more)
Image 1 indicates that between 2007 and 2009, the number of companies 
releasing sustainability reports for the first time slightly increased. In the 
mid- to late-2000s, as the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) first published 
the Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) index and the GRI G3 guidelines 
were released, the global movement rapidly shifted towards sustainability 
management. Likewise, in Korea, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration established 
an institutional framework on sustainable development and promulgated the 
“Framework Act on Sustainable Development (2007),” which aims to achieve 
balanced economic growth, social integration, and environmental preservation, 
requiring evaluation of sustainability and then drafting and disclosing sustainability 
reports via the central government and local governments every two years. All 
of these efforts have had a great impact on the overall trend of sustainability 
reporting in Korea. Following this trend, in 2009, the government amended 
the Industrial Development Act, encouraging businesses to voluntarily adopt 
sustainability management practices, including measures for setting global 
standards and norms for sustainability management, for enhancing industrial 
competitiveness through sustainability management, and for building and 
expanding the base for voluntary sustainability management by businesses, 
thereby drawing companies’ interest in sustainability business practices. 
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Table 6: Chronology of Sustainability Reporting 
Year Key Event Remarks
1976 OECD issues the world’s first guidelines on global corporate citizenship Global
1987 The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) releases definition of “Sustainable Development” in its “Our Common Future” Global
1992 Establishment of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) during the Rio Summit Global
1995 POSCO: First Korean company to produce an environmental report Domestic
1997 US environmental group Ceres and United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) partner to establish the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Global
2000 GRI released sustainability reporting guidelines Global
2000 Kofi Annan UN Secretary General created the UN Global Compact (UNGC) Global
2000 Establishment of non-profit organization the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) headquartered in the U.K. Global
2000 Kim Dae-Jung administration established the Presidential Advisory Group “Commission on Sustainable Development” Domestic
2001 France enacted the Nouvelles Regulations Economiques Act (NRS Act), legally binding CRS implementation for the first time in Europe Global
2002 Ministry of Environment established “Environmental Reporting Guidelines” Domestic
2003 Samsung SDI: first in Korea to issue a Sustainability Report Domestic
2003 Accountability based in U.K. published assurance standard AA1000 Global
2004 Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE): First to issue a Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) Index Global
2005 Ministry of Trade and Commerce issues Korean Sustainability Management Reporting Guideline BSR guideline (B.E.S.T sustainability Reporting Guidelines) Domestic
2006 Publication of GRI G3 guidelines Global
2006 International Finance Corporation (IFC) issues “Policy and Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability” Global
2007 Roh Moo-Hyun Administration enacted a “Framework Act on Sustainable Development” Domestic
2009 Industrial Development Act defined sustainable industrial development as a major goal and amends provisions regarding sustainability management practice Domestic
2009 Lee Myung-Bak administration enacted a “Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth” and established a Presidential advisory group “Presidential Committee on Green Growth” Domestic
2010 International Organization for Standardization (ISO) issues corporate social responsibility management standard ISO 26000 Global
2011 Prof. Michael Porter and Mark Kramer presented the concept of “Creating Shared Value” through Harvard Business Review Global
2012 Released guidance on social responsibility KS A ISO 26000:2012 Domestic
2012 Korea Environmental Industry & Technology Institute (KEITI) published Green Management Reporting Manual Domestic
2013 Publication of GRI G4 guidelines Global
2013 IIRC unveiled Framework on Integrated Reporting Global
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Second, large corporations having huge capital are taking the lead in implementing 
sustainability reporting. Among those released in 2013, 59 reports were by listed 
companies (3.2%), showing a very low level of publication rate. In contrast, among 
the top 30 listed companies designated by the Korea Fair Trade Commission, 23 
produced sustainability reports, showing the highest percentage of sustainability 
reporting, and that large corporations dealing with multiple stakeholders such 
as investors, management and staffs, partners, and consumers tend to use their 
sustainability reports to accommodate the needs and requirements of internal
/external stakeholders in their business practice and facilitate communication.6 
Table 7: Implementation of Sustainability Reporting by Korea’s Top 30 Companies 
Ranking Company Name Reporting Ranking Company Name Reporting
1 Samsung O 16 LS O
2 Hyundai Kia Motors O 17 Dongbu O
3 SK O 18 Kumho Asiana O
4 LG O 19 Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering O
5 Lotte O 20 Daelim O
6 POSCO O 21 Hyundai O
7 Hyundai Heavy Industries X 22 Boo Young X
8 GS O 23 S-Oil O
9 Hanjin O 24 OCI O
10 Han O 25 Hyundai Department Store X
11 KT O 26 Hyosung O
12 Doosan O 27 Daewoo E&C O
13 STX O 28 GM Korea X
14 CJ O 29 Dongguk Steel X
15 Shinsegae X 30 Youngpoong X
* includes reporting by affiliates
6 The Korea Fair Trade Commission annually issues a list of Korea’s Top 30 Large-scale 
Companies, excluding non-privatized public corporations.
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Third, sustainability reporting by public agencies also accounted for a large 
share (32%), mainly for the purpose of responding to business performance 
evaluation and public relations (PR) in order to promote their organizations. 
In April 2007, with the implementation of the “Act on the Management of 
Public Agencies,” all data relevant to business performance and the operations 
of Korean public agencies subject to business performance evaluations were 
disclosed in the “Public Agency Management Disclosure System (ALIO).” 
Moreover, pursuant to Article 48 of the Act, public corporations and para-
governmental agencies shall be evaluated on their business performance.7 
Since the government reviews and utilizes business evaluation data during 
budget allocation for public agencies including incentive payment, relevant 
agencies are investing much labor and time to obtain high scores in their 
business performance evaluation. Rah Young-Jae et al. (2010), in a study on the 
use of sustainability reports for public agency performance evaluations has revealed 
that the sustainability report publication agency for public agencies or UN 
Global Compact member agencies can be correlated with business performance 
evaluations by the government, confirming that sustainability indictors and 
business performance indicators are correlated, making it statistically likely 
that detailed indicators impact each other. The study thus supports the idea 
that public agencies are implementing sustainability reporting as a way to 
receive good scores for their business performance. Moreover, as is the case 
with private companies, public agencies distribute their reports to multiple 
stakeholders or disclose them on their websites in order to promote their 
organizations and use them as agency presentation materials when seeking a 
global presence.8
7 Business performance evaluation has become a key management and evaluation method 
by the government over the past 3 decades, motivating public agency CEOs to improve 
their business efficiency and instilling in agency members a sense of responsibility 
and motivation to attain their goals (Korean Association for Policy Sciences, 2010).
8 Korea Electrical Power Corporation uses its sustainability as a means to promote its 
organization for IR activities and develop overseas businesses, with agencies such as 
the Korea Resources Corporation, Korea Airport Corporation, KEPCO Plant Service 
& Engineering, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power, Korea Minting, Security Printing & 
ID Card Operating Corp. also utilizing their sustainability reports as annex materials 
for overseas sales, PR, and marketing (Ra Young-Jae et al., 2010).
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4. Readers’ Feedback on Sustainability Reports 
Every year, the Korea Standards Association conducts a study on the “Usage & 
Attitude of Sustainability Reports” and presents the Korean Readers’ Choice 
Awards (KRCA) with the goal to examine the current use of sustainability 
reports in Korea and to look at future prospects. KRCA are given to the top 
report as selected on-line by readers of sustainability reports of Korean 
companies, and aims to enhance the quality of sustainability reporting by 
Korean firms by incorporating the study. Subsequent feedback from the 
multiple stakeholders on business agendas encourages firms not to draft a 
mere promotional report but a user-oriented report that discloses their practical 
sustainability performance.9 
This section, based on findings of the “Korea Standards Association Report 
on Usage and Attitude of Sustainability Reports in 2013,” focuses on the 
diverse feedback obtained from Korean readers towards sustainability reports.
1) Target and Methodology
For the “Study on the Usage and Attitude of Sustainability Reports in 2013,” 
the Korea Standards Association conducted a survey of different stakeholders 
and experts who have read sustainability reports by Korean firms for a nearly 
1 month period from July 22 to August 23, 2013. A group of 2,505 readers 
and users of sustainability reports took part in the on-line survey, and a group 
of 57 experts took part via e-mail. As a result, a total of 2,562 samples were 
obtained for this study. The study was conducted separately for readers and 
non-readers of sustainability reports, and the questionnaire was comprised of 
13 questions. 
9 Korean Sustainability Conference 2014 website (http://ksi.or.kr/ksi/contents/intro_
krca.asp) 
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Image 2: Survey Questionnaire on Usage and Attitude of Reports in 2013
• Why do you read sustainability management reports?
• Why don’t you read sustainability management reports? 
• Source of sustainability information (excluding reports).
• Condition for changing attitude toward reports. 
• Level of agreement regarding reports. 
• How to effectively demonstrate stakeholder engagement?
• Considerations for future stakeholder engagement. 
• Key elements of a successful report. 
• Frequently omitted items in reports. 
• Key elements showing commitment to sustainability management. 
• Items required for assurance. 
• Sustainability reporting assurance providers.
• Sustainability performance assurance providers. 
Sections (2) to (11) will elaborate on the responses provided to 10 out of the 14 
questions. 
2) Why Do You Read Sustainability Reports? 
75.61% of respondents said they read sustainability reports “to improve their 
overall understanding of the relevant company,” which achieved higher ratios 
than 2011 (74.8%) or 2012 (71.7%). Other key responses included “to learn 
about the performance of the relevant company (53.26%)” and “to seek 
information on the relevant market (43.58%).” 
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Response
2011 
(n=294)
2012 
(n=703)
2013 
(n=537)
To obtain an overall understanding of the relevant company 74.8 71.1 75.61
To deeply understand issues that are exclusive to the relevant 
company 52 36.8 38.73
To establish the accountability of the relevant company 26.3 14.5 15.64
To learn about the performance of the relevant company 60.9 48.7 53.26
To seek information on the relevant market 51 39.3 43.58
To benchmark the relevant company 42.5 27.1 32.03
For education/research purposes 24.8 14.2 15.46
For public use (journalist, PR specialist) 20.4 7.1 8.75
To use the report as primary data for making decisions on the 
relevant company 20.8 12.9 16.2
Others 1 0.4 0.19
3) Why Don’t You Read Sustainability Reports? 
When asked the reason for not reading sustainability reports, the largest number 
of respondents said because they “do not know the value of sustainability 
reports (29.05%).” Others replied that they “lack time to search information 
(28.04%),” followed by “because there is no information that is relevant to 
them (27.36%).” 
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Response 2011 (n=283)
2012 
(n=590)
2013 
(n=296)
There is not much information in the report that is relevant to me 39.2 34.6 27.36
I have other ways to examine sustainability performance of 
companies or agencies 10.6 9.49 8.45
Because it is difficult to have credibility in the information 
contained in the sustainability report 19.4 7.8 10.81
Sustainability report fails to fully satisfy my curiosity 19.4 15.1 14.19
Sustainability report does not impact my decision-making 
regarding relevant company or agency 15.2 18.5 14.19
I don’t know in which context sustainability report is valuable 42.1 27.6 29.05
I do not have time to search information on complicated 
websites or read long reports 37.8 25.7 28.04
Company or agency I am interested in does not seem committed 
to sustainability management 16.3 5.1 4.39
Because I do not know how to use the information contained 
in sustainability report for my decision-making 29.3 22.9 26.69
Others 8.8 3.9 5.74
4) Source of Sustainability Information (excluding reports)
The majority of respondents obtained information on the corporate sustainability 
management (excluding reports) “generally from the mass media (58.14%),” 
which was followed by “directly contacting the relevant company and agency 
(37.21%).”
Response 2011 (n=54)
2012 
(n=80)
2013 
(n=43)
Possible to directly contact relevant company/agency 44.4 33.7 37.21
Seek information through individuals or groups involved with 
relevant company/agency 22.2 18.8 20.93
Utilize benchmarking reports or diverse materials from credit 
assessment bodies, sustainability management evaluation bodies, etc. 42.5 31.2 25.58
Usually from mass media 85.1 50 58.14
Others 5.56 3.7 4.65
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5) Conditions for Changing Attitude Towards Reports 
When non-readers were asked about conditions for changing their attitude 
towards sustainability reports, 38.51% replied that they would change their 
attitude “when the disclosure and communication on sustainability performance 
is improved.” The answers also included “identification of the interests of 
diverse stakeholders (36.82%),” followed by “increased link between corporate 
strategy and performance reports (36.15%).”
Response 2011 (n=283)
2012 
(n=590)
2013 
(n=296)
Reinforced disclosure and communication of sustainability 
performance 44.17 44.58 38.51
Increased link between corporate strategy and sustainability 
performance within sustainability reports 45.23 34.58 36.15
Clear evidence that responding to sustainability issues means 
contributing to business performance 27.92 25.25 27.03
Increased engagement to identify the needs of diverse 
stakeholders including myself 42.4 40 36.82
Expanded worldwide education on the existence of sustainability 
reports and their value 34.63 22.88 29.73
Improved quality to enhance the credibility of sustainability 
reports 32.51 23.73 25.34
Independent assurance to enhance the credibility of sustainability 
reports 27.56 14.24 17.23
Others 1.01 0.85 1.41
6) How to Effectively Demonstrate Stakeholder Engagement? 
The best way to show stakeholder engagement is through “designation of key 
stakeholders and a presentation of the involvement process,” which topped 
list for three consecutive years from 2011 (66.83%), followed by a 
“demonstration of the correlation between stakeholder engagement and 
identified issues (53.9%).” 
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Response 2011 (n=251)
2012 
(n=503)
2103 
(n=410)
Designate key stakeholder and present engagement process 70.5 62 66.83
Include key results of stakeholder engagement 56.5 49.1 44.88
Show link between stakeholder engagement and identified issues 60.1 47.7 53.90
Show link between stakeholder engagement and strategy, 
and goal-setting 57.7 48.1 49.27
Include ‘Feedback Card’ or e-mail addresses in reports 44.2 29.6 33.17
Include detailed feedback of key stakeholders in reports 19.5 8.3 11.46
Others - - 0.24
7) Considerations for Future Stakeholder Engagement 
As the most important considerations for future stakeholder engagement, 
readers indicated “improving relations by minimizing conflicts and risks (61.64%) 
and “recognizing the impact on stakeholders (58.29%)” as key factors.
Response 2011 (n=294)
2012 
(n=703)
2013 
(n=537)
Improve relations by minimizing conflicts and risks 64.9 59.3 61.64
Identify new issues that can impact business 62.5 53.2 51.02
Recognize company’s impact on stakeholders 64.9 54.6 58.29
Provide solutions to address dilemmas 42.1 26.8 33.52
Choose sustainability report content that reflects stakeholder 
interests 23.4 10.1 9.87
Others - 0.1 -
8) Key Elements of a Successful Report
Sustainability report users chose “commitment of company/agency” as the 
most important element to be included in sustainability reports (83.8%), ranking 
Sustainability Reporting Trend in Korea
46
number one for two consecutive years from 2012, followed by “alignment with 
the overall strategy (70.95%)” and “concrete performance indicator (64.8%).”
Response 2013
Company/agency’s commitment to sustainability 83.8
Include alignment methodology between overall strategy and sustainability 
management strategy 70.95
Concrete performance indicator 64.80
Strategy and agenda setting 63.87
Goal and KPI setting 61.64
Include risk and opportunity factors of relevant company 〮agency 61.45
Practical tips for implementing sustainability management by relevant company
/agency 59.78
Case analysis and best practice 57.73
Innovative thinking 57.36
Role of leadership 56.80
Activities of company/agency to address sustainability management issues 56.61
Process & methodology for selection and evaluation of important issues 55.49
Include performance company/agency 54.75
Analysis of market trend and developments 54.56
Impact on external factors regarding sustainability of company/agency 51.58
Deep listening and consideration of stakeholder feedback 48.79
Include dilemma and concerns of company/agency 45.44
Include procedure and process for controlling sustainability management 43.39
Worst practice 42.64
Link with annual financial report 38.36
All items above 17.88
Others 0.37
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9) Key Elements for Showing Commitment to Sustainability Management 
Sustainability report users replied that in order for companies/agencies to 
show full commitment to implementing sustainability management, “disclosure 
of corporate performance data” was the most important, with the highest 
percentage of 47.01% or responses, followed by “thorough stakeholder 
engagement process (42.72%)” and “role of leadership (38.81%).”
Response 2011 (n=294)
2012 
(n=703)
2013 
(n=536)
Thorough stakeholder engagement process 57.5 44.1 42.72
Disclosure of corporate performance information 53.4 39.1 47.01
Role of leadership 48.6 40.1 38.81
Full disclosure of data that is of advantage and disadvantage 
to company, agency 47.3 29.1 34.14
Extensive scope of theme and data in sustainability report 29.6 13.3 13.43
Alignment with enterprise-wide business strategy 44.9 36.1 36.75
Disclosure of improvement items of company, agency 41.8 28.4 33.58
Disclosure of important sustainability issues mentioned 43.9 25.3 32.65
External assurance of data contained in report 40.1 19.7 25.19
Disclosure of the details of the goals and related action
/implementation plan 21.1 15 20.15
Others - 0.4 0.19
10) Items Requiring Assurance
In order to enhance the credibility of sustainability reporting in 2013, when 
asked which items required assurance during reporting, the largest number of 
respondents answered that both items “related to sustainability reporting by 
company, agency” and “related to sustainability performance by company/agency” 
were required (42.64%). Between the two items of “report” and “performance,” 
respondents indicated that assurance of “sustainability performance” was 
preferred (27.93%). 
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Response 2011 (n=294)
2012 
(n=703)
2013 
(n=537)
Related to Sustainability Reporting by company/agency 20.4 17.6 16.2
Related to Sustainability Performance by company/agency 21.8 30.5 27.93
Both items above needed 49.7 38.6 42.64
Both items above not needed 2.00 3.00 4.28
No comment 6.1 10.1 8.94
11) Report Assurance Providers 
When asked who should provide sustainability report assurance, respondents 
preferred “Specialized Assurance Agency (59.42%)” for three consecutive 
years from 2011, followed by an “expert (43.83%)” and “head of a multiple
-stakeholder group (32.4%).” 
Response 2011 (n=205)
2012 
(n=384)
2013 
(n=308)
Expert 52.8 45.3 43.83
Specialized assurance agency 65.6 48.9 59.42
Head of multiple-stakeholder group 43.1 37.2 32.4
Internal audit team of company, agency 25.1 7.2 8.12
Others 0.5 0.5 0.3
5. Conclusion and Implications 
With stakeholders’ growing interest in corporate sustainability management, 
the sustainability reporting requirements in countries like Denmark, India, 
Singapore, and the U.S. have increased, leading to a greater number of 
sustainability reports being produced each year. Concurrent with this global 
trend, sustainability reporting in Korea is expected to further accelerate. 
For example, Park Geun-Hye administration, newly established in 2013, 
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highlighted economic democracy, and called for stronger social responsibility 
from businesses. And in April 2014, the “other public agency” category—
which had long been excluded from business performance evaluations—was 
included in the evaluation; it is expected to add momentum to sustainability 
reporting after its slight slowdown since 2012. 
Reporting on sustainability performance by businesses is a crucial activity, as it 
means that the relevant organization is not merely seeking financial benefits 
but also working to understand its future direction by identifying organizational 
issues from a sustainability context. Moreover, the trend for organizations to 
voluntarily build a governance system for sustainability management, establish 
and implement mid-term goals, and utilize guidelines and assurance norms 
aligning with global standards to enhance credibility of the report, seems to be 
an appropriate way to move forward. 
However, it is difficult to ascertain whether the level of an organization’s 
sustainability is growing at the same pace as the increase in sustainability 
reporting. There are also organizations that view sustainability reports as a 
once-a-year task to get over with or as a promotional brochure. Numerous 
companies have failed to internalize sustainability management deep within 
their organizations, as evidenced by organizations that issue sustainability 
reports to obtain good business performance evaluations, have disparate 
sustainability management and company-wide strategies, and intentionally 
omit negative performances and issues in their reports. 
Readers in Korea want to know whether the sustainability reports they read 
include “company/agency’s commitment to sustainability management” and a 
“practical system and solutions to enhance the economic/environment/social 
values of businesses by “aligning enterprise-wide strategies with sustainability 
management strategies.” Therefore, it is asked of Korean companies and 
public agencies to practice more mature sustainability management, one that 
befits Korea’s economic standing as the world’s 15th largest GDP, having 
achieved US$1 trillion in trade for three consecutive years. 
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Measures for Improving the Corporate 
Governance of Listed Companies in Korea1 
Jeong Jae-Kyu
Yang Chun-Seung
Ⅰ.  Introduction
In Korea, considerable public and private efforts have been made to improve 
the corporate governance of listed companies, especially since the financial crisis 
in 1997, and as a result many practical improvements have been implemented2. 
Nevertheless, both internal and external criticisms persist, casting doubt on 
the degree of corporate governance practiced by Korean listed companies3. 
This uncertainty is attributable to the fact that corporate governance cannot 
be improved in a short period of time, and that changes should consider the 
diverse political, economic, and social contexts that are specific to Korea. 
This paper focuses on the evaluations of the corporate governance of listed 
companies, which is one of the annual ESG evaluations carried out by the 
Korea Corporate Governance Service in order to identify the level of corporate 
governance practiced by listed companies in Korea. Furthermore, the paper 
will look at the current corporate governance practice by listed companies in 
1 This paper is revisited, complemented, and reorganized based on the paper entitled 
“Corporate Governance of Listed Companies” published in Volume 5 No. 2 (2013.12) 
of the Yonsei Global Business Law Review (YGBL) of the Yonsei University Global Business 
and Legal Center.
2 Since 1998, the government has continued to reform the Commercial Code, Securities 
and Exchange Act, Act on External Audit of Stock Companies to introduce various 
schemes attempting to improve the corporate governance of many companies: systems 
for cumulative voting, written ballots, outside directors, auditing committees, etc. The 
2004 OECD research on the corporate governance of member countries also includes 
Korea’s remarkable progress in terms of institutional framework in this field. “OECD, 
Corporate Governance — see “A SURVEY OF OECD COUNTRIES” (2004).
3 For example, according to the CLSA/ACGA joint study on corporate governance in Asian 
countries in 2012, Korea ranked 8th among 11 countries, even lagging behind Thailand, 
Malaysia, and India. See CG Watch 2012”, Asia Corporate Governance Association.
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Korea, with the idea that the right prescription for changes can only be made 
based on an accurate review of the current situation. From this diagnosis, the 
paper will then discuss the Commercial Code reform bill, which has been 
initiated from an institutional context in an attempt to improve the corporate 
governance of listed companies, with a particular focus on controversial issues 
surrounding the mandatory introduction of the cumulative voting and electronic 
voting systems, the separate election of directors serving on the Audit committee, 
and subsequently proposing recommendations for improvement. Finally, the 
paper will offer guidance on future directions in terms of how to achieve practical 
results in a Korean business environment regarding issues of enhancing the 
qualification requirements of directors and auditors, and the rationalization of 
shareholders’ meetings. 
Ⅱ.  Situation on Corporate Governance of Listed Companies in Korea
1. Evaluation of Governance of Listed Companies in Korea 
In this section, we will briefly present the Korea Corporate Governance 
Service (KCGS), which conducts an annual ESG evaluation survey among 
listed companies in Korea, aiming to identify the level of governance practiced 
in these companies. Here, the E (Environment), S (Social), G (Governance) 
evaluation models and the evaluation process of KCGS will be also presented. 
A. Overview of KCGS 
The Korea Corporate Governance Service (KCGS) is a non-profit incorporated 
association that was established in June 2002 pursuant to Article 32 of the Civil 
Act, under the mandate to provide specialized services in terms of evaluation 
and research pertaining to corporate governance and the social responsibility 
practice of businesses. KCGS aims to conduct evaluations and research on 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility (CSR) to then propose 
sustainable development measures for businesses, thereby contributing to the 
sound development of the capital market. Major activities include the evaluation 
of corporate governance and CSR of companies, research into corporate 
governance and CSR, identification and awarding of best practices for CSR, 
ranking of CSR (corporate governance, environmental, and social areas), 
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guidance on CSR and Sustainably Responsible Investment (SRI), elaboration 
of corporate CSR reports (sustainability report), guidance on voting rights 
exercised by institutional investors, and publication of CSR and SRI documents. 
To support KCGS, the Korea Exchange, Korea Financial Investment Association, 
Korea Listed Companies Association, and KOSDAQ Association are included 
as member organizations.
B. ESG Best Practices and ESG Evaluation Model Development of KCGS 
Before the official establishment of KCGS, the Corporate Governance Reform 
Committee consisted of specialist groups from different sectors, which first 
began activities in their respective fields. This Committee, funded by the Korea 
Exchange, established “Corporate Governance Best Practices” in September 
1999, which then served as a reference guide for listed companies in Korea 
for voluntarily improving their corporate governance, and helped them to 
implement sound corporate governance practices. In 2002, the Korea 
Corporate Governance Service (KCGS) was established by succeeding all the 
rights and roles of its predecessor. 
Since its establishment, KCGS has been committed to developing evaluation 
models to assess the corporate governance of listed companies based on the 
Corporate Governance Best Practice guidelines, and has carried out annual 
evaluations. These evaluation models have evolved in line with the changing 
market and regulatory environment. The evaluation results from such evaluation 
models have then been utilized for policy development, new product development, 
index calculation, and academic research, and used as reference data for 
voluntary corporate improvement. Furthermore, the market also appreciates 
the values that such highly credible evaluations generate. 
To the meet both the global trend of corporate social responsibility (CSR)4 and 
the diverse interests of the environment, consumers, and the local community, 
KCGS incorporated the Best Practice and Evaluation Model from the 
Environmental (E) and Social (S) areas into the corporate Governance (G) 
4 On November 1, 2010, the International Standard Organization (ISO) officially published 
and confirmed ISO 26000 as the international standard for Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR), thereby drawing the attention of international organizations to CSR. 
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evaluation model, thereby finalizing the “ESG Integrated Evaluation Model” 
in 2010. The development of such a best practice and integrated evaluation 
model first began in 2009, and from the outset, experts from environment and 
social areas were committed to perfecting the best practice and evaluation 
models by forming an advisory committee. The ESG Integrated Evaluation 
Model and Best Practices finalized by KCGS was expected to serve as a guide 
for the voluntary participation and improvement of CSR activities for 
businesses and as useful information on CSR management practice principles 
and norms for relevant stakeholders.
What is more, while developing the ESG Integrated Evaluation Model, KCGS 
tried to preserve the unique characteristics of each model while maintaining 
the consistency and the harmonization of evaluation methods and indicators 
within the integrated model. Therefore, the evaluation model used in this 
study to calculate the SRI score can be considered as a consistent, integrated 
evaluation model that harmonizes all ESG elements. Moreover, this corporate 
governance evaluation model is the only official governance evaluation model 
in Korea, and its findings have been deemed highly credible in the market over 
the past 10 years. Note that information on the model harmonization is 
available in the section on the evaluation model composition. 
C. Characteristics and Uptake of ESG Evaluation Model of KCGS
The ESG Integrated Evaluation Model and Best Practices developed by 
KCGS apply global standards such as ISO26000, which will become the 
global norm for CSR. Moreover, a key characteristic of this model is that it is 
a Korean evaluation model that accommodates local needs by adapting the 
questionnaire to a Korea-specific business environment. 
Currently, KCGS provides Governance (G) evaluation results to the Korea 
Corporate Governance Stock Price Index (KOGI) of the Korea Exchange, as 
well as the SRI Index and SRI Eco Index based on the new ESG Integrated 
Evaluation Model. Furthermore, these evaluation results facilitate the promotion 
of ESG activities in listed companies, awards and ranking of successful 
companies in corporate governance, ESG related studies, the development of 
new SRI-related products, and academic research and policy development for 
CSR and SRI development, among others. 
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D. ESG Evaluation Process at KCGS
In the first half of each year, KCGS researchers use data that includes disclosed 
business reports, sustainability reports, press information, government 
institutional data, and websites to directly evaluate the level of CSR activities 
led by businesses. Then, an auto-verification process takes place, and the 
results of the verification are uploaded to a website that was developed for this 
purpose. Before confirming the evaluation results, companies can look at the 
data, which is one of the greatest strengths of the KCGS evaluation in ensuring 
the fairness and credibility of the evaluation outcome, while encouraging corporate 
engagement. The corporate feedback process allows each company to confirm 
and print the questionnaires and results when needed, and also to provide 
detailed feedback for each question of the survey. The evaluation content can 
then be revised based on the feedback, thereby enabling a mutual consensus to 
be reached by both KCGS and companies regarding the evaluation results. 
After the evaluation, results are confirmed and KCGS selects and awards 
successful companies for each ESG element, assigns a ranking, and provides 
basic data to calculate the KRX Index. The most important aspect of this 
process is that the analysis report is provided free-of-charge to all companies 
subject to the evaluation. This provision encourages companies to voluntarily 
improve their CSR activities, and furthermore to seek sound development of 
the capital market—which is in accord with the founding vision of KCGS. 
Moreover, all annual evaluations are stored and managed in a database to be 
used for academic research and policy development purposes in order to 
facilitate CSR and SRI practices. 
E. Introduction to ESG Evaluation Model of KCGS
As corporate sustainable growth has become such an important buzzword in 
today’s business sector, various evaluation models have emerged in attempts 
to identify sustainable companies and evaluate their sustainability. Evaluation 
models such as SAM, EIRIS, and MSCI (Riskmetrix Group merger) have been 
introduced to assess the sustainability level of Korean businesses. SAM and 
EIRIS evaluation results are respectively included in DJSI and FTSE4Good 
for evaluation, thus attracting considerable interest from Korean businesses. 
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However, global evaluation models commonly fail to consider the corporate 
culture or regulatory environment specific to Korea, and hence have 
limitations for providing an accurate evaluation. In the SAM evaluation 
model, once the quantitative evaluation is performed for the economic, social, 
and environmental contexts, industry-specific characteristics are then 
considered. Therefore, it is only possible to evaluate the level within the 
industry group, and the industry classification is somehow inconsistent with 
the reality in Korea. Similarly, the EIRIS evaluation model focuses on the 
investment efforts of businesses regarding social responsibility in terms of 
environmental and social contexts, stakeholders, and human rights; thus, is 
designed to assist the decision making of investors. The MSCI evaluation 
model assesses the governance, human resources management, stakeholders, 
products, services, and environmental business practice. However, as it is 
designed to assess the intangible value of businesses, in the form of a 
qualitative evaluation, only a cross-industry comparison is possible. 
The above evaluation models are generally used for a qualitative evaluation 
and take into account industry-specific characteristics, making it difficult to 
ensure the quantification of corporate sustainability and further assess the 
extent of sustainability covering all businesses. Moreover, the evaluation 
indicators that are commonly applied to global firms may include some that 
are not fully consistent with the Korean context, possibly creating a risk of 
under-evaluating the sustainability performance of Korean companies. As a 
result, KCGS has developed new evaluation models for the Environmental 
(E) and Social (S) contexts while combining the existing corporate Governance 
(G) evaluation model to finalize the “Korea-specific Model of Integrated 
ESG Evaluation.” This integrated model effectively accommodates all key 
characteristics of each model while maintaining the harmonization and 
consistency of model composition, evaluation indicators, and evaluation 
method. For example, the corporate governance evaluation model is Korea’s 
only governance evaluation model and has gained extensive credibility from 
the market during the past decade. The elements and the scores for each 
model are as indicated in the three tables below5. 
5 Examples of corporate governance evaluation model, environmental evaluation 
model, and social evaluation model are based on the 2013 ESG evaluation models of 
Korea Corporate Governance Service.
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Table 1: Environmental Evaluation Model of KCGS
Category 
(Number of Questions) Subcategory Score Ratio
I. Environmental 
Strategy (7) 1. CEO Commitment 65 22%
I. Environmental 
Strategy (7) 2. Environmental Strategy and Policy 65 22%
II. Environmental 
Organization (7) 3. Environmental Organization Culture 35 12%
II. Environmental 
Organization (7) 4. Environmental Organization Structure 35 12%
III. Environmental 
Management (43) 5. Goal Setting & Planning 110 36%
III. Environmental 
Management (43) 6. Supply Chain Management 110 36%
III. Environmental 
Management (43) 7. Clean Production System 110 36%
III. Environmental 
Management (43) 8. Environmental Risk Management 110 36%
III. Environmental 
Management (43) 9. Environmental Accounting 110 36%
III. Environmental 
Management (43) 10. Environmental Performance Management 110 36%
III. Environmental 
Management (43) 11. Environmental Audit 110 36%
IV. Environmental 
Performance (28) 12. Resources 65 22%
IV. Environmental 
Performance (28) 13. Climate Change 65 22%
IV. Environmental 
Performance (28) 14. Environmental Laws & Regulations 65 22%
IV. Environmental 
Performance (28) 15. Green Product and Service 65 22%
V. Stakeholder 
Response (6) 16. Environmental Reporting 25 8%
V. Stakeholder 
Response(6) 17. Stakeholder Response Activity 25 8%
Total (91 questions) 300 100%
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Table 2: Social Evaluation Model of KCGS
Category 
(Number of Questions) Subcategory Score Ratio
I. Employee (27) 1. Employment and Working Condition 140 47%
I. Employee (27) 2. Labor-Management Relations 140 47%
I. Employee (27) 3. Health and Safety at Work 140 47%
I. Employee (27) 4. Manpower Development & Assistance 140 47%
I. Employee (27) 5. Basic Rights at Work 140 47%
II. Partner and 
Competitor (17) 6. Fair Trade 64 21%
II. Partner and 
Competitor (17) 7. Anti-Corruption 64 21%
II. Partner and 
Competitor (17) 8. CSR Facilitation 64 21%
III. Consumer (14) 9. Fair Trade vis-a-vis Consumer 66 22%
III. Consumer (14) 10. Consumer Safety and Health 66 22%
III. Consumer (14) 11. Consumer Privacy Protection 66 22%
III. Consumer (14) 12. Communication with Consumer 66 22%
IV. Local Community (8) 13. Community Engagement and CSR 30 10%
IV. Local Community (8) 14. Economic Development of Community 30 10%
IV. Local Community (8) 15. Communication with Local Community 30 10%
Total (66 questions) 300 100%
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Table 3: Corporate Governance Evaluation Model of KCGS 
Category 
(Number of Questions) Subcategory Score Ratio
I. Shareholder 
Protection (29) 1. Protection and Exercise of Shareholder Rights 90 30%
I. Shareholder 
Protection (29) 2. Ownership 90 30%
I. Shareholder 
Protection (29) 3. Dealing with Affiliated Persons 90 30%
II. Board of 
Directors (25) 4. Composition of Board of Directors 80 27%
II. Board of 
Directors (25)
5. Operation, Evaluation and Compensation 
of Board of Directors 80 27%
III. Disclosure: Business 
Transparency (27) 6. Disclosure-General 70 23%
III. Disclosure Business 
Transparency (27) 7. Disclosure-Website 70 23%
IV. Audit Body (13) 50 17%
V. Distribution of 
Profit (3) 10 3%
Total (97 questions) 300 100%
As indicated in Table 1, the environmental evaluation model consists of 5 
categories and 17 subcategories, including a total of 91 evaluation indicators, 
for a total score of 300. The social evaluation model, as seen in Table 2, consists 
of 4 categories and 15 subcategories, including a total of 66 evaluation indicators, 
for a total score of 300. The governance evaluation model shown in Table 3 is 
a well-known model, and has been in the market for the past 10 years; it 
consists of 5 categories and 9 subcategories, including a total of 97 evaluation 
indicators, for a total score of 300. 
The following section will present highlights of the 2013 results of the evaluation 
that was conducted among listed companies, which will serve as an important 
precondition to draw measures for improving corporate governance. 
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2. Governance Evaluation Result of Listed Companies in Korea in 2013 6
The 2013 corporate governance evaluation conducted by the Korea Corporate 
Governance Service included 693 companies listed on the KOSPI Market and 
908 companies listed on the KOSDAQ Market. The 2012 evaluation was 
conducted among 710 KOSPI-listed companies and 890 KOSDAQ-listed 
companies. The evaluation outcomes below are based on the evaluation analysis7. 
A. Current Status by Market
The average governance score of the KOSPI Market was 35.44 out of 100, 
similar to that of 2012 (35.43), and the average KOSDAQ governance score 
was 30.57, which is very low compared to KOSPI. This is probably because 
215 venture firms, which are not subject to regulations that should be applied 
to companies with over a certain asset size, are included. However, the highest 
score for the KOSPI Market and the KOSDAQ Market were 74.67 and, 60.00 
respectively, and KOSPI saw a 2.66-point drop compared to the previous 
year, whereas KOSDAQ saw a slight increase. In particular, the highest score 
for KOSDAQ was slightly higher than 2012, but still showed big gap compared 
to the KOSPI’s highest score, leaving much room for improvement. 
Table 4: Corporate Governance Evaluation Scores by Market 
Category KOSPI Market KOSDAQ Market 
Category 2012 2013 2012 2013
Shareholder Protection 53.74 (78.89) 53.77 (75.56) 55.41 (78.89) 53.97 (75.56)
Board of Directors 19.01 (76.25) 19.72 (83.75) 13.37 (53.75) 13.38 (53.75)
Disclosure 24.99 (77.14) 24.40 (74.29) 19.33 (55.71) 20.31 (61.43)
Audit Body 47.59 (100.00) 47.96 (92.00) 33.68 (82.00) 34.72 (82.00)
Distribution of Profits 24.51 (100.00) 23.70 (100.00) 15.82 (90.00) 14.90 (100.00)
Total Score 35.43 (77.33) 35.44 (74.67) 30.78 (59.67) 30.57 (60.00)
※ ( ) denotes highest possible score 
6 Governance evaluation results of listed companies in Korea seen below are based on 
the internal analysis data of the Korea Corporate Governance Service and are not yet 
disclosed through any publication. 
7 For the analysis of the 2011 evaluation findings, refer to Oh Duk-Gyo, “Governance 
Status of the KOSPI Market and KOSDAQ Market”, Corporate Governance Review, 
vol. 59, Korea Corporate Governance Service, 2011. Reference. 
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Both markets show relatively higher scores in terms of “Shareholder Protection” 
and “Audit Body” compared to other sections. This difference is because 
“Shareholder Protection”, contrary to the other sections, has numerous 
questions asking for the existence of an institutional framework or system in 
violation of shareholder rights, and if such an instrumental framework or 
system does not exist, additional points were given. The “Audit Institution” 
section has many questions pertaining to internal control systems, and since 
the regulatory environment surrounding internal controls has recently become 
more stringent, higher scores were given based on the degree of conformity 
with regulations. 
As for the “Board of Directors” and “Disclosure”, average scores were low 
but the highest scores were high, which indicates that only few companies 
were actively involved in relevant activities. The “Board of Directors” section 
evaluates both systems and activities, and “Disclosure” evaluates mostly 
activities; therefore, low scores in both areas imply a lack of activity taking 
place in relevant areas. As for the average score by section in each market, the 
KOSPI Market showed higher scores in all section, except for “Shareholder 
Protection,” compared to KOSDAQ. The average KOSDAQ score was 0.2 
higher than KOSPI, which is a large decrease from the 1.67 gap from the 
previous year, and this is probably because KOSDAQ-listed companies have 
fewer affiliates and a simpler equity composition, whereas KOSPI-listed 
companies have a greater number of affiliates with intricately linked ownership 
structures. 
B. Current Status by Asset Size8
By dividing the groups into business groups having assets worth at least KRW 
2 trillion, and those with under KRW 2 trillion, it was possible to distinguish 
the level of governance improvement through regulatory means or through 
voluntary commitment. Major governance-related regulations under the 
Commercial Code are applied to listed companies having a total asset worth at 
8 Companies were divided into an asset size of “at least KRW 2 trillion” and “under 
KRW 2 trillion” as of the ends of 2011 and 2012. The number of companies having 
at least KRW 2 trillion increased by 1 from 143 in 2012 to 144 in 2013, and those 
having under KRW 2 trillion decreased from 567 in 2012 to 549 in 2013. 
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least 2 trillion won as end of the previous fiscal year. The average governance 
score for KOSPI-listed companies with at least 2 trillion won (45.62) was 
much higher than those under 2 trillion won (32.79), and in 2013, the score 
gap between the two groups was 12.83, which was a slight decrease compared 
to 2012 (13.33). Both groups also showed a large score gap in areas such as 
“Board of Directors,” “Audit Body,” and “Disclosure.” Such differences can 
be explained by the fact that, in the areas of “Board of Directors” and “Audit 
Body” it is mandatory for listed companies to establish an outside director 
nomination and Audit committees and to elect outside directors whose 
number is not less than a majority of the total number of its directors. 
Regarding “Disclosure,” it has been found that companies having assets of at 
least KRW 2 trillion provide a great deal of information regarding their 
corporate governance practices through their websites and are more active in 
disclosing IR information, financial result forecasts, and data in English. 
Table 5: Comparison of Governance Scores by Asset Size (KOSPI Market)
Category at least KRW 2 trillion under KRW 2 trillion 
Category 2012 2013 2012 2013
Shareholder Protection 54.69 53.74 53.50 53.78
Board of Directors 31.19 32.88 15.94 16.30
Disclosure 40.14 40.26 21.17 20.27
Audit Body 67.36 67.97 42.61 42.76
Distribution of Profits 26.85 25.80 23.92 23.11
Total Score 46.08 45.62 32.75 32.79 
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Image 1: Score Difference in Governance Evaluation by Asset Size (KOSPI Market)
점수:score
주주권리보호 (Shareholder Protection), 이사회 (Board of Directors), 공시 (Disclosure), 감사기구 (Audit Body), 
경영과실배분 (Distribution of Profits), 총점 (Total Score).
C. Current Status by Business Group9
In 2012 and 2013, the governance scores for business groups having no leader 
was higher than those having a leader, with the former group showing higher 
scores in all areas except for “Shareholder Protection” and “Audit Body.” 
Both comparative groups had lower scores compared to 2012; however, as for 
the business group having no leader, the score dropped by 1.06 points, which 
is greater than for the “with leader group”(0.06 points). In “Shareholder 
Protection,” the average scores of both groups were lower than the KOSPI 
Market average (53.77), which means that regardless of whether a leader was 
present, large business groups displayed a higher percentage of investing in 
their affiliates and making frequent transactions with their affiliates. 
9 Among 62 business groups subject to the limitations on mutual investment, announced 
by the Korea Fair Trade Commission in April 2013, 48 groups (excluding 21 public 
corporation groups and 3 business groups with no listed companies) as well as 243 
listed companies under business group, were analyzed and in 2012, 48 out of 62 business 
groups (excluding 11 public corporations group and 3 business groups without listed 
companies) as well as 252 listed companies under business group were analyzed. 
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The “without leader business group” received higher scores in “Board of 
Directors,” “Disclosure,” and “Distribution of Profits” compared to its 
counterpart, probably because a business group that has no leader has a more 
democratic decision making process than the autocratic management common 
by leaders’ families, ensuring a greater chance for a relatively fair distribution 
of profits. 
Table 6: Governance Score Trend by Business Group
Category Business Group w/ Leader Business Group w/o Leader
Category 2012 2013 2012 2013
Shareholder Protection 50.87 50.62 53.22 50.51
Board of Directors 23.07 24.28 28.88 29.66
Disclosure 31.35 31.14 34.86 33.41
Audit Body 56.49 57.08 55.30 53.62
Distribution of Profits 19.73 19.87 20.50 25.38
Total Score 38.58 38.52 41.70 40.64
Image 2: Comparison of Governance Scores by Business Groups in 2013 
주주권리보호 (Shareholder Protection), 이사회 (Board of Directors), 공시 (Disclosure), 감사기구 (Audit Body), 
경영과실배분 (Distribution of Profits), 총점 (Total Score), 총수있는기업집단 (Business Group with Leader), 
총수없는 기업집단 (Business Group without Leader), 유가증권시장 (KOSPI). 
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D. Current Status of Major Issues10
(1) Written Ballot, Electronic Voting, and Cumulative Voting Systems 
72 KOSPI-listed companies adopted a system for exercising voting rights by 
written ballot (10.39%), reflecting the lack of convenience for investors to 
exercise their voting rights. There were no (0%) of KOSPI-listed companies 
having introduced the system for exercising voting rights via electronic means, 
confirming a complete lack of adoption for electronic voting. Moreover, 662 
companies (95.53%) were found to be undermining the exercise of minority 
shareholder rights by excluding cumulative voting for protecting minority 
shareholders from their by-laws. As such, written ballots, electronic voting 
and cumulative voting systems that were introduced to protect minority 
shareholders are bearing not much fruit. 
Table 7: Status of Written Ballots, Electronic Voting, and Cumulative Voting 
Systems 
Category 2012 2013
Implementation of Written Ballots 67 (9.44%) 72 (10.39%)
Implementation of Electronic Voting 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Implementation of Cumulative Voting 41 (5.77%) 34 (4.91%)
(2) Exercise of Minority Shareholder Rights
The number of listed companies whose minority shareholder rights were 
exercised before the shareholders’ meeting in 2013 were 17, representing 3 
more companies than in 2012; however, the percentage of minority shareholder 
rights being exercised still remains low at 2.45%. 
Table 8: Status of Exercise of Minority Shareholder Rights
Description 2012 2013
Exercise of Minority Shareholder Rights 14 (1.97%) 17 (2.45%)
10 The analysis below included 693 KOSPI-listed companies, 908 KOSDAQ-listed 
companies for 2013, 710 KOSPI-listed companies and 890 KOSDAQ-listed companies 
for 2012. 
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Image 3: Status of Exercise of Minority Shareholder Rights by Type in 2013
사외이사후보추천 (Outside Director Nomination), 감사위원후보추천 (Audit Committee Member Nomination), 
주주총회 의안제안 (주주제안권) (Shareholder Proposal Rights), 회계장부열람권행사 (Rights of Inspection 
of Books and Records), 기타 (Others), 기업수 (Number of Companies). 
(3) Separation of CEO and Chairman of Board of Directors
It has been identified that 39 companies elect CEOs and the Board Chair 
separately, which is a 1/3 decrease from 61 in 2012, with 17 of these companies 
electing an outside director as the Board Chair. Most companies (94.37%) 
appointed their CEO as Board Chair, which undermines the independence of 
Board operations. 
Table 9: Status of Separate Elections for CEO and Chairman of Board of 
Directors
Description 2012 2013
Separation of CEO and Chairman of Board of Directors 
(Outside Director serves as Board Chair)
61
(19)
39
(17)
(4) Establishment and Organization of Audit Committee
In 2013, a total of 254 companies have established an Audit committee, which 
is an increase of 18 companies compared to 2012. Among the companies 
having Audit committees, the number of companies subject to mandatory 
establishment increased by 14, whereas voluntary establishment increased by 
4. The number of companies having established an Audit committee in 2013 
increased as a whole, though the number of companies having elected a 
standing auditor decreased by 24 compared to 2012. 
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Table 10: Overview of Audit Bodies
Description 2012 2013
Standing Auditor 395 371
Establishment of Audit Body (mandatory establishment) 236 (127) 254 (141)
Among 254 companies having established an Audit committee, 221 companies 
(87.01%) elected one or more financial experts, and the average percentage of 
outside directors within the Audit committee is 91.04%, accounting for a 
higher percentage of outside directors compared to other Board committees. 
Table 11: Organization of Audit Committees
Description 2012 2013
With at least one number of financial expert 210 221
Percentage of outside directors 90.93% 91.04%
3. Sub-conclusions
As such, the level of governance improvement among listed companies in 
Korea remains unsatisfactory, as revealed by the evaluation results, despite the 
multi-faceted efforts initiated by the government and capital market participants. 
Although some progress has been made, such as the introduction of institutional 
frameworks for improving corporate governance, many questions are being 
raised as to whether these measures are being implemented as originally 
intended. Moreover, despite the fact that an extensive list of disqualification 
criteria for outside directors has been defined, doubts regarding the independence 
of these appointed directors have been constantly expressed. There is also an 
issue of whether the mandatorily established Audit committees for listed companies 
having assets worth at least KRW 2 trillion are effectively performing their 
roles, compared to previous audit systems.
Moreover, major signs for corporate governance improvement, such as written 
ballot systems, electronic voting systems, and cumulative voting systems are 
either being introduced and implemented out of formality or are not being 
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considered at all. Aware of such problems, the Korean government has proposed 
a progressive bill to reform the Commercial Code, aiming to improve corporate 
governance. However, at present, the future of this reform bill is in limbo, 
facing fierce opposition from the business sector. 
Against this backdrop, the following section will provide some implications, 
issues and improvement proposals regarding the mandatory introduction of 
cumulative voting systems, electronic voting systems, and the separate election 
of directors serving on the Audit committee, which are particularly controversial 
issues regarding the pending Commercial Code reform bill. In addition, 
considerations and recommendations for strengthening qualifications of 
auditors and rationalization of shareholders’ meetings will be presented, 
which are not at present included in the reform bill, and yet are potential areas 
of improvement. 
Ⅲ. Major Tasks for Improving Governance of Listed Companies in Korea
1. Partial Mandatory Adoption of Cumulative Voting System 
A. Current Status
Cumulative voting was first introduced into the Commercial Code in 1998, 
with the aim to protect the rights of minority shareholders and to improve 
corporate governance following the financial crisis in 1997. The concept of 
cumulative voting originated in 1870, when it was first introduced in order to 
elect members of the House of Representatives in the State of Illinois, United 
States. The theoretical ground for cumulative voting is that it complements 
weaknesses of the current majority voting rule. For example, if a controlling 
shareholder with a 51% stake and another shareholder with a 49% stake exist, 
under the current election system, all directors are elected according to the 
preference of the controlling shareholder, such that the shareholder with the 
49% stake cannot elect a director who can speak on their behalf in the Boards. 
In particular, in places like Korea, where the controlling shareholder not only 
monitors business activities but is also involved in the day-to-day operations 
and uses business resources for personal benefit, if the Board is dominated by 
the controlling shareholder, no measures can be taken by the other minority 
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shareholder to proposed a counter check and balance.
Yet, despite the introduction of the cumulative voting system, most listed 
companies in Korea fail to include this system in their by-laws, and such a 
trend is gaining momentum. Companies incorporating cumulative voting in 
their by-laws continue to decrease in number, proving that the cumulative 
voting system has de facto become a useless system11. As a result, since July 2013, 
the Ministry of Justice announced its plan to legislate a partially mandatory 
introduction of cumulative voting as a means to protect not the majority but the 
minority shareholders and to monitor the activities of the majority shareholders 
and senior management. However, the amendment provision on cumulative 
voting, contrary to what had been announced during the 1st public hearing, 
reduces the scope of companies subject to this mandatory introduction from 
“all listed companies” to “listed companies with at least a certain asset size.” 
B. Major Issues
First, opponents argue that the mandatory provision of cumulative voting in 
the Commercial Code violates the shareholder equality rule and majority rule 
in the stock company system, in which the rights are proportionately assigned 
based on the “one share one vote” principle12. However, as mentioned above, 
the reason why “one share one vote” is believed to be rational is because without 
this system, the controlling shareholder can secure all managerial rights with 
minimum financial burden, thereby enabling an incompetent and immoral 
manager to secure or maintain managerial rights, which is quite problematic 
for the company. On the other hand, cumulative voting is a system designed to 
act in the interests of other shareholders, who can then add checks and balances 
to the business management leader when electing members of the Board. 
Indeed, in today’s corporate world, the role of supervising managerial practices 
is becoming all the more critical. In this regard, however, the objective of 
“one share one vote” system does not apply to cumulative voting. In most 
11 Among listed companies in Korea, the number of companies maintaining cumulative 
voting was 52 (90) in 2007, 52 (91) in 2008, 45 (47) in 2009, 40 (34) in 2010, 38 (31) 
in 2011, and 34 (27) in 2010 for the KOSPI (KOSDAQ) Market. 
12 Bae Sang-Geun, “Commercial Code Reform Public Hearing on Corporate Governance” 
discussion text, Ministry of Justice, 25 June 2013. 
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Korean companies having an individual controlling shareholder, the controlling 
shareholder already enjoys excessive control of voting rights through friendly 
shares, including the equity of affiliates. It is therefore necessary to strengthen 
the voting rights of minority shareholders. 
Another opposing argument is that parties likely to be interested in the 
election of corporate directors are not the minority shareholders but main 
shareholders, including institutional investors, pension funds, hedge funds. 
And since their financial goal is to primarily increase the return on investment, 
they are not likely to act in a direction that would ultimately maximize the 
profits of minority shareholders13. However, theoretically speaking, directors 
have a duty to ensure the care and loyalty of their companies; therefore, it is a 
very biased argument that directors elected via cumulative voting would 
ignore the interest of the overall company and act in a factional manner, 
oblivious to the important roles and responsibilities that they should assume 
as directors. The maximized return on investment sought by institutional 
investors such as pension fund and hedge fund managers can be realized by 
enhancing the values of the companies they invest in. Therefore, it is difficult 
to accept the argument that they can impose management policies that are 
disadvantageous to the corporate value or other minority shareholders14. For 
example, some argue that foreign investors can ask for a too large a share of 
the dividends, and may in fact “eat and run” after receiving their dividends. 
However, it should be noted that foreign investors can only exercise voting 
rights based on their equity and do not have the final say on the dividend 
payments. Therefore, any so-called “excessive” dividend payout is ultimately 
subject to decisions made at the shareholders’ meeting. In the case a dividend 
payment is truly deemed “excessive,” it will lead to a cash and investment fund 
shortage for the company in question. Since this in turn will have a negative 
impact on the company’s stock prices, which will not only undermine the 
interests of the foreign investors but also the overall shareholders, appropriate 
decisions will be made during the shareholders’ meeting. 
13 Choi Jun-Sun, supra note 11, 8-9.
14 Park Gyeong-Suh, supra note 8, 35-36.
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Others argue that directors elected by cumulative voting may raise questions 
regarding the individual profiteering and opportunistic behaviors of specific 
minority shareholders, thereby undermining the efficiency of the Board 
operations15. A counter-argument would be that the bigger problem is that the 
Boards in Korean companies currently fail to adequately implement checks 
and balances and promote an exchange of ideas, but rather rush to adopt 
company proposals without much questioning. Even though the cumulative 
voting system has been in place for the past 10 years and that 3-40 listed 
companies have adopted this system, outside directors have rarely been 
elected through this system. Thus, even with the mandatory adoption of the 
cumulative system going forward, only companies having at least 2 outside 
directors on the Board will be affected, and even if the outside directors are 
elected via this method, such cases will be limited and will only represent a 
small percentage of all Board members. As such, if the item presented to the 
Board were reasonable, even if one or two outside directors oppose, the 
motion would be adopted in the Board meeting with the help of numerous 
other logically thinking directors. The current situation is that absolute majority 
of listed companies, which are run by funds invested by many investors, are 
refusing to implement the cumulative voting system. And this shows how 
distorted the views of the current senior management and controlling 
shareholder are, who even tend to avoid directors that represent the opinion 
of the minority shareholders. 
Some also argue that among 20 countries having a cumulative voting system in 
place (i.e., the U.S., Japan, Russia, and Taiwan), only a few (i.e., Russia, Mexico, 
and Chile) have legislated the mandatory implementation of cumulative voting 
systems. However, these few cases of mandatory legislation of cumulative voting 
do not serve as a supporting argument to oppose its mandatory introduction. 
All countries have a unique history, traditions, economic structure, different 
levels of social awareness, and organizational culture, resulting in diverse forms 
of governance. For example, Germany with its strong social-democratic 
traditions, unlike other advanced countries, has legislation mandating that 
15 Ju Jin-Yeol, “Review of Issues Regarding Indirect Mandatory Introduction of 
Cumulative Voting System”, Major Issues and Evaluation of Commercial Code 
Reform Bill (Korea Economic Law Association Summer Academic Symposium, 
2013. 8), 105-107.
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labor representatives serve on the (audit) committee. And yet, no one argues 
that corporate governance in Germany lags behind or is over-regulated 
because it is a form of governance selected by reflecting the economic and 
social conditions specific to Germany. On the other hand, in Korea, the 
controlling shareholder tends to dominate the managerial rights in business 
management, more so than in any other advanced country, with some 
engendering social problems due to their illegal and unethical behaviors. 
According to evaluations conducted by international institutions such as 
CLSA/ACGA over the past 10 years, Korea has been one of the lowest 
ranking countries in terms of governance among 11 Asian countries, which is 
increasingly becoming worse. Given the fact that, in reality, improving the 
governance efforts by providing best practices has not been overly successful, 
it may be more appropriate to adopt a legal requirement for cumulative voting 
system as a measure to protect the property rights of minority shareholders. 
For example, during the post-1997 financial crisis, the governance level of 
Korean companies was greatly improved through the legislation of requiring 
an outside director. 
C. Sub-conclusions
It is quite reasonable to expect that companies required to implement 
cumulative voting system will be limited to corrupt and underperforming 
companies whose corporate value has decreased or are under-evaluated 
because the Board directors have failed to fulfill their roles. An entity who 
nominates an additional candidate to conduct cumulative voting must bear a 
great deal of the financial and non-financial burden, with associated costs 
including searching for the right candidate, executing shareholder proposal for 
nomination, and securing voting rights through a proxy contest. Therefore, 
there have been few shareholder proposals for nominating directors to date, 
which suggests that the chances of abusing cumulative voting are not very 
high, nor is the concern voiced by its opponents16. There were 8 shareholder 
proposals among Korean listed companies in 2012 and 19 in 2013; only 6 
companies submitted a shareholder proposal for vote in 2012, and 9 in 2013, 
16 Among S&P 500 companies, there were 585 shareholder proposals during the 
shareholders’ meeting of the first half of 2012, which increased to 612 in the first 
half of 2013. 
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which indicates a relatively large participation of outside shareholders in 
management compared to other developed countries. 
Instead of expecting that it is not the controlling shareholders but the 
shareholders-elected directors that will act opportunistically through cumulative 
voting, it is more reasonable to expect that the latter would monitor the 
management. And even if minority shareholders and institutional investors 
argue about ideas that would pursue immediate gains and potentially undermine 
corporate competitiveness in the long run, such irrational arguments will be 
amply countered by the directors who are elected by other shareholders. In 
fact, in today’s Boards, the more pressing problem is the practice of just sitting 
by and watching a certain majority shareholder solely seek personal benefits, 
which consist of directors nominated and elected by the majority shareholder 
and management. Therefore, directors being elected not by the majority 
shareholder but by other shareholders serving on the Board means there will 
be an increased diversity of the Board make-up, which in turn will lead to more 
diverse proposals for the Board to vote on, leading to active discussions and a 
reasonable decision-making process. 
Another important consideration is that under the “staggered term system” 
that has been introduced by most listed companies in Korea, the cumulative 
voting system’s effectiveness will be weakened, thus reducing problems 
regarding the partial mandatory introduction of the cumulative voting system. 
In general, the average term of a director in a Korean listed company is 3 years; 
however, if there are fewer than 3 directors serving on a Board, due to the 
staggered term system, it is difficult to submit a proposal for electing 2 or more 
outside directors. In order to strengthen the effectiveness of cumulative voting, 
it is necessary to abolish the staggered term system; however, since there is 
currently no motivation for companies to voluntarily abolish the staggered 
term system, relevant institutional complementarity is required. 
The requirement for claiming the exercise of cumulative voting rights must be 
reduced from the current 1% (listed companies with at least KRW 2 trillion in 
assets, other companies 3%) to 0.5% (listed companies with at least KRW 2 
trillion in assets, other companies 1%). Furthermore, the new provisional 
requirement on holding the position for 6 consecutive months is still a strict 
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condition compared to other developed countries, and therefore needs to be 
further improved17. Options may include adjusting an independent stockholder’s 
rights, alleviating the equity share requirement, or defining a minimum 
equity value (for example KRW 10 million) as a requirement, as is the case in 
developed countries. It is also difficult to find a specific reason as to why the 
right to “claim” cumulative voting should be restricted to long-term investors, 
unlike in the shareholder proposal rule or right to claim the dismissal of 
directors or auditors, which require shareholders to be relatively long-term 
investors. Thus, deleting the requirement for 6 consecutive month holding 
needs to be reviewed. 
As the cumulative voting system aims to ensure proportionate director election 
rights by the non-controlling shareholder versus the controlling shareholder, 
in order for the reform bill to ultimately reap the intended benefits, it is 
necessary to analyze the advantageous and disadvantages of the relevant 
systems and seek improvements in parallel. The cumulative voting system is 
useless if the list of company-only nominated candidates is submitted for the 
agenda item for direct election during the shareholders’ meeting, i.e., if there 
are no nominations for director proposed by the shareholders. Therefore, 
without improving the reality in which shareholder proposals rarely take place 
regarding the election of directors, cumulative voting is highly likely to remain 
as a useless system, thus it is important to actively promote shareholder 
proposals18. 
One example would be to promote the nomination of outside directors by 
institutional investors and expand relevant infrastructures such as the 
establishment of an outside director manpower bank. For the cumulative voting 
system to result in the election of candidates nominated by shareholders, it is 
crucial that minority shareholders including the institutional investors actively 
exercise their voting rights during the shareholders’ meeting. Hence, it is 
17 Jung Jae-Gyu, supra note 15, 39-40. 
18 According to the KCGS survey of the KOSPI Market, of listed companies having 
held shareholders’ meetings in the 1st quarter of 2013, shareholder proposals took 
place in only 9 companies (5 companies for outside director election, and 4 companies 
for inside director election), with nominations voted down in 8 companies, except 
for the 1 company whose proposal originated from the controlling shareholder. 
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important to actively consider ways to promote investors to exercise their 
voting rights in particular institutions. Concurrently, it is essential to revisit the 
systems relevant to shareholders’ meetings. For example, it is customary for 
the majority of listed companies to submit nominees for both inside and 
outside directors as one proposal for a vote, making it difficult for investors 
to object to the election of a specific individual director. However, it is 
recommended that proposals for electing candidates be submitted for each 
and every candidate, putting an end to the abuse of current practices. 
2. Partial Mandatory Introduction of Electronic Voting System
A. Background
Most listed companies in Korea hold annual shareholders’ meetings on the 
third and fourth Friday of March, and these meetings are held in different 
locations across the country. According to the current Commercial Code, in 
companies without a written ballot and electronic voting system in place, only 
a person denoted the shareholder’s proxy can attend these shareholders’ 
meetings and exercise their voting rights. However, due to institutional 
constraints, a single shareholder is prohibited from attending the meetings of 
multiple companies on the same date; thus limiting their ability to exercise 
their voting rights. On May 28, 2009, following the introduction of Article 
368.4 following the amendment of the Commercial Code, the foundation for 
having electronic shareholders’ meetings was laid. However, even though it 
has been 4 years since its implementation, its uptake remains very low. 
Indeed, it is in this context that the Commercial Code reform bill calling for 
mandatory electronic voting was proposed. According to the revision proposal, 
shareholders of listed companies prescribed under Presidential decree in 
consideration of the number of shareholders, can exercise their voting rights 
electronically without the need to attend the shareholders’ meetings in person 
(Reform bill Article 542-14).Therefore, a listed company having a minimum 
number of shareholders must allow shareholders to exercise their voting 
rights via electronic means upon request. 
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B. Major Issues
As it becomes easier for individual shareholders to cast their votes, the essence 
of shareholders’ meetings will be improved. If electronic voting remains 
optional, as it is today, shareholders unable to attend the shareholders’ 
meeting can be granted the opportunity to exercise their voting rights only 
when the company allows for them to do so. Therefore, the key to the reform 
bill was, unlike the current system, to allow shareholders to decide to vote 
electronically without requiring a special decision of the Board. That is, 
mandatory electronic voting can be interpreted as: “if the shareholders wish, 
the company must allow shareholders to vote electronically”19. Today, due to 
the separation of ownership-management, indifference of minority shareholders 
and increased costs due to time and geographical constraints, shareholders 
meetings have come to lose their essence. In this regard, electronic voting 
combined with written ballots and proxy solicitations will facilitate the 
exercise of voting rights by shareholders. Hence, the current reform bill fits 
perfectly the need to address the issue of shareholders’ meetings losing their 
essence, and loss of momentum as being considered a mere dispersion of 
shares, since it is effective for overcoming diverse side effects such as technical 
errors resulting from electronic voting and by facilitating communication with 
minority shareholders. 
 
C. Sub-conclusions 
If a shareholders’ meeting remains as a process of unilaterally realizing 
governance or management decisions, it cannot practically reflect the interests 
of all members of the company in question. As electronic voting becomes 
mandatory, and minority shareholders actively express their opinions on-line, 
and as companies promote communication with minority shareholders and 
send positive signals to the market, it can lead to a virtuous cycle of enhancing 
the market value of businesses. 
19 Kwon Jong-Ho, “Necessity and Reason for Progressive Mandatory Implementation 
of Electronic Voting System”, Major Issues and Assessment of Commercial Code 
Reform Bill (Korea Economic Law Association Summer Academic Symposium. 
August, 2013), 86.
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Some have pointed out possible technical errors inherent in electronic voting 
systems; however, these systems have already been widely used in the U.S. and 
are neither highly sophisticated nor technically complex. Others are also 
concerned with the possible distortion of voting results through vicious rumors 
or politics in the media, though these issues can be regulated using current 
laws and be overcome by the benefits that electronic voting would bring.
3. Separate Election of Directors Serving on the Audit Committee 
A. Background
The current law requires the implementation of an election “en bloc,” 
meaning that directors are first elected during the shareholders’ meeting, and 
the Audit committee are then elected. During the 1st step of electing directors 
en bloc, the 3% voting rights limitation rule of the majority shareholder does 
not apply during the decision-making process of the shareholders’ meeting. 
Therefore, it is natural that the Audit committee members are elected from 
among directors who are elected according to the preference of the controlling 
shareholder. During the 2nd step, the voting rights limitation rule does apply; 
however, it fails to attain the true objective of the 3% voting rights limitation 
rule of the majority shareholders, which is another issue. 
Among the Commercial Code reform bill of the Ministry of Justice, pre-announced 
for legislation on July 17, 2013, the revised Article 542-12 stipulates the 
mandatory implementation of the separate election of Audit committee members 
for listed companies having assets worth at least KRW 2 trillion. Directors 
who will also serve on the Audit committee shall be elected separately from 
other directors, so that the 3% voting rights limitation rule remains applicable, 
even from the election stage20 21.
20 Some argue that applying the 3% rule for auditor election is unconstitutional. Ha 
Heon-Ju, “Problems and Solutions of Audit System of Stock Companies”, Property 
Law Study, Volume 25, 2nd Edition, 2008, 268.
21 3% rule application when selecting auditors does not pose any problem in terms of 
purpose and method, therefore it is not unconstitutional. This perspective is according 
to Lee Chul-Song “Status of Auditor-Theory and Practice”, Listed Company Audit 
Committees Circular, No.123 (Korea Listed Companies Meeting, 2010. 3), 2010, 3; Jung 
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B. Major Issues
The first issue to consider is whether the Board is a participatory type or a 
supervisory type. Under the Commercial Code, an Audit committee is a Board 
committee, which has the authority to substitute auditors and supervise the 
performance of duties of directors. However, a participatory Board member, 
as a Board member, becomes involved with decisions affecting the performance 
of Board duties, i.e., they audit the performance of their own duties, which 
presents limitations in preserving objectivity. Moreover, as for the current 
system of election en bloc, the rule limiting the voting rights of the controlling 
shareholder and affiliated persons does not apply, such that minority shareholders 
have insufficient equity shares to elect members to serve on the Audit committee. 
Therefore, an Audit committee is only meaningful when it works as a supervisory 
Board, and in terms of organizational status, it is an institution under the 
Board and works as a participatory Board. The Audit committee is different 
from the Board and should remain an independent institution. Moreover, as 
for the status of its members, the members serving on the Audit committee 
are directors, and are therefore different from auditors. If a company has a 
supervisory type Board, one that includes executive officers, since the Audit 
committee is one of the committees on the Board, it is appropriate to assign 
them the authority to elect and dismiss members of the Audit committee to 
the Board. In this regard, a separate election system that ensures independence 
of the Audit committee from the controlling shareholder — even from the 
election stage — is very significant. 
Opponents to this Reform Bill have raised concerns about the threats to 
managerial right coming from speculative foreign funds22. It is an unrealistic 
argument that the Boards of Korean companies will be dominated by 
foreign funds23. The major examples cited by businesses regarding threats 
Joon-Woo, “Review of Problems of the 2009 amended Commercial Code regarding 
Audit of Stock Companies”, Comparative Private Law, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Korea Association of 
Comparative Private Law), 2010, 347.
22 Choi Jun-Sun, “Review of Issues Regarding the Separate Election of Audit Committee 
Members”, Major Issues and Evaluation of Commercial Code Reform Bill (Korea 
Economic Law Association Summer Academic Symposium, 2013. 8), 7-11. 
23 Park Kyung-Suh, “Panel Discussion on Commercial Code Reform Bill for Improving 
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to managerial rights from foreign capital include SK Telecom in 1999 (Tiger 
Fund), SK Corp. Ltd. in 2003 (Sovereign), Samsung Corporation in 2006 
(Hermes), and KT & G in 2006 (Carl Icahn), which only accounts for four 
cases in the 15 years since the 1997 financial crisis. Moreover, one should not 
forget that these cases involved companies whose market value failed to meet 
the potential book value and were exposed to governance problems. As for 
the argument that exponential costs are incurred in defending the managerial 
rights, these are not in fact actual costs but seem to be over evaluated in the 
investment context, and most are costs that are required to improve corporate 
governance. In particular, given the constraint of the current Fair Trade Act 
in which acquisition of at least 15% equity is subject to business merger 
assessment, the chances of multiple foreign capital investors uniting with one 
another remain very minimal. 
Another issue is whether to apply the summed 3% rule or separate 3% rule for 
restricting the controlling shareholder voting rights. As for an Audit committee 
member who is neither an auditor nor an outside director, the voting rights are 
restricted to 3%, which is the sum of the stakes of only the majority shareholder 
and its affiliated persons (summed 3% rule), whereas for and Audit member 
serving as an outside director, the 3% voting rights limitation is applied to all 
individual shareholders (individual 3% rule), and such regulation needs to be 
improved. 
The reason for applying the 3% rule as an exception of “one share one vote” 
is because the role of the Audit committee member is to restrict the unlimited 
intentions of the controlling shareholder and its affiliated persons by exercising 
the actual managerial rights. Therefore, we agree to the approach of limiting 
voting rights to 3% by summing the stakes of affiliated persons, including all 
shareholders without distinguishing auditors, Audit members not serving as 
outside director, Audit members serving as outside directors etc. In fact, the 
“one share one vote” system is commonly considered the most reasonable 
system, based on the concept that shareholder voting rights must be proportionate 
to their investment. And if there is a shift away from this system, the controlling 
Corporate Governance” Discussion Text (jointly organized by Jeon Hae-Chul assemblyman 
office, Seo Ki-Ho assemblyman office, 2013.11), 30.
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shareholder may secure managerial rights with minimum financial burden, 
increasing the likelihood of an incompetent or immoral management leader 
securing or preserving managerial rights24. On the other hand, even though 
Korean companies have constraints in issuing superior voting right stocks, the 
controlling shareholder can directly minimize the equity share while preserving 
managerial rights by issuing preferred stock equity to affiliates through recurring 
investments. Therefore, the fact that the controlling shareholder already enjoys 
excessive rights that are not proportionate to their investment compared to 
other shareholders can serve as rationale to limit the exercise of shareholder 
rights or to control shareholders and affiliated persons25. 
 
C. Sub-conclusions
In conjunction with the separate election process for Audit committee members, 
another consideration is that there is a need to handle Audit committee member 
election as an individual proposal such that each Audit member can vote in the 
shareholders’ meeting26. Even in the case of opposing a specific candidate 
among the individual Audit committee member candidates, if the election of 
all Audit committee members is proposed as a single motion for adoption, it 
is practically impossible for institutional investors and minority shareholders 
to vote down specific nominations. Therefore, for the practical application 
of shareholder rights during Audit committee member election, it is more 
reasonable to handle each individual Audit member candidate as a separate 
proposal to vote on. 
4. Enhanced Qualification Requirement of Directors and Auditors 
A. Current Regulations Under the Commercial Code 
In order for the Board to operate in the best interests of all shareholders, it is 
not sufficient to merely strengthen the qualifications of outside directors and 
24 For example, the method of securing controlling rights using a small capital investment 
is by either owning shares of superior voting rights or by the concentrated purchase 
of common stocks when preferred stocks are issued. 
25 Park Kyung-Suh, supra note 12, 31-32.
26 Jung Jae-Gyu, “Public Hearing for Commercial Code Reform on Corporate Governance”, 
discussion text, Ministry of Justice, 2013. 6, 38-39.
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improve the election process, but there is also a need enhance the qualification 
requirements of non-outside directors, executive officers, and auditors27. 
Pursuant to Commercial Code 542-8, the outside director of a listed company 
refers to “a person for whom two years have not yet elapsed since their 
imprisonment without prison labor or a heavier punishment was completely 
executed or exempted” and “a person for whom two years have not yet 
elapsed since he was dismissed or removed from office after he/she violated 
an Act separately determined by Presidential Decree.” However, there are no 
similar qualification requirements for directors, executive officers, or auditors 
(Commercial Code Article 382, Article 408-2, Article 409, Article 542-5). As a 
result, even if a conglomerate leader or CEO is imprisoned due to malpractice 
and/or embezzlement, they can maintain the director position or even be 
newly elected as a director.
B. Regulatory Legislation by Sector
Some regulations limit the qualifications of executives; Article 18 of the Banking 
Act stipulates that “any person who has been sentenced to imprisonment 
without prison labor or heavier punishment and for whom five years have not 
elapsed since they completed the sentence or was exempted from the sentence” 
or “any person who has been sentenced to a fine or heavier punishment under 
finance-related Acts and for whom five years have not elapsed since he 
completed the sentence or was exempted from the sentence” is disqualified 
from selection as an executive. Moreover, pursuant to the Framework Act in 
the Construction Industry (Article 13) and Control of Firearms, Swords, 
Explosives, etc. Act (Article 5), if any person who has been sentenced to 
imprisonment, is elected as an executive within a certain period, the construction 
license registration shall be restricted or the manufacturing license shall not be 
approved. The Telecommunications Business Act Article 9 also limits the 
qualifications of executives. 
27 Kim Woo-Chan, “Panel Discussion on Commercial Code Reform for Improving 
Corporate Governance” presentation, (jointly organized by Jeon Hae-Chul assemblyman 
office, Seo Ki-Ho assemblyman office, 2013. 11), 19-20.
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C. Reinforcing Qualification Requirements of Directors and Auditors of 
Listed Companies 
Some may say that it is practically impossible to enforce the qualification 
requirements of directors and auditors in all companies, pursuant to the above 
legislation. However, there seems to be no issue in applying such requirement 
to companies listed in the official capital market, allowing investors to freely 
trade stocks. Therefore, for listed companies, whether it be directors, executive 
officers, and auditors, and not outside directors, the following persons should 
not qualify to become corporate executives: an minor or person who is incompetent 
or quasi-incompetent; any person who has been declared bankrupt, and not 
yet reinstated; any person who has been sentenced to imprisonment without 
prison labor or heavier punishment and for whom two years have not elapsed 
since they completed or was exempted from the sentence; or any person who 
has been dismissed or removed from office in violation of the status 
prescribed under Presidential Decree and for whom two years have not 
elapsed since such dismissal or removal from office. Of course, it is also 
important to stipulate that any person to whom any of these cases applies — 
even after becoming director, executive officer or auditor — shall lose their 
position.
5. Rationalization of Shareholders’ Meeting 
A. Status on Organization of Shareholders’ Meeting
The ineffectiveness of shareholder meetings of listed companies in Korea is 
not a recent problem. Since the notice for holding a shareholders’ meeting 
should be made two weeks prior to the actual meeting date, pursuant to the 
Commercial Code28, it is not easy for foreign investors or minority shareholders 
to fully deliberate on the agenda items and exercise their voting rights. In 
particular, foreign investors living abroad have difficulty exercising their 
voting rights based on these procedures, not to mention having time to 
deliberate on issues. Related to agenda items, questions also arise as to whether 
sufficient data are provided in advance of the shareholder meeting being held, 
especially with such short notice being given. What is worse, during the last 
28 See Article 363-1 of the Commercial Code.
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few years, the shareholder meetings of listed companies have taken place on 
specific dates, such as the 2nd and 3rd Friday of March, the so-called “Super 
Shareholder Meeting Days”29, and due to these overlapping dates if shareholders 
hold equity in many different companies they would be unable to attend all 
shareholders’ meetings and effectively exercise their voting rights. This current 
trend poses a serious threat for outside shareholders such as institutional investors 
and minority shareholders as they may be unable to attend shareholders’ meetings 
and exercise their voting rights. A few issues that need to be improved on are 
as follows. 
B. Disclosure of Business Report Prior to Shareholders’ Meeting
The Capital Markets Act stipulates that the submitted business reports shall 
include financial statements and set forth dividends approved by the shareholders’ 
meetings. Moreover, when reporting the confirmation of corporate tax30, the 
financial statement must be submitted. As a result, shareholders’ meetings 
must be held within 90 days following the end of the business year, which is 
also the deadline for the business report. For this reason, the shareholder 
meetings of listed companies having conducted annual closings in December 
are typically held in March. As a result, the schedule relevant to closing, 
auditing, and holding shareholders’ meeting must be expedited, placing a 
burden on businesses; thus considerably restricting the exercise of voting 
rights of institutional investors. Moreover, the auditor and outside auditor’s 
audit schedule is defined based on the shareholders’ meeting date, and thus the 
audit tasks and quality improvement may require more time, compared to the 
business report deadline. In order to mitigate these issues, it should be made 
possible to submit the financial statement, which is an attached document 
used for submitting the business report and reporting the confirmation of 
corporate tax, upon obtaining approval from the Board on the premise of the 
auditor’s qualified opinion. Even items that require approval by shareholders’ 
meetings as stated in the business report (financial statements, dividends, etc.), 
29 This year, the number of listed companies having held shareholders’ meeting on 
March 14 and 21 were 118 and 662 respectively; thus, 778 in total, representing 44% 
of all listed companies (1761). 
30 The relevant Act mandates that reports be made within 3 months following the last 
day of the month, which includes the closing date of each business year. 
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should be allowed to be included upon approval by the Board, and in the case 
of requiring approval for revision during the shareholders’ meeting, the 
revised version of the business report shall be disclosed. Moreover, it is also 
necessary to mandatorily disclose the business report before the decision and 
notice of holding a shareholders’ meeting so that shareholders can verify and 
review the business reports and the business performance of competitors in 
advance, and then exercise their voting rights31. Moreover, if the deadline for 
audit-related tasks, including audit, audit report submittal, disclosure, and 
provision of financial statements, are based on the business report deadline, 
it will be possible to largely lessen the audit workload and contribute to 
enhancing the audit quality. 
C. Extension of Notice Period of Convocation of Shareholder Meeting
As mentioned above, the deadline for providing notifaction of a shareholder 
meeting pursuant to the Commercial Code is two weeks prior to the actual 
meeting, which is very tight and seriously undermines the exercise of voting 
rights by shareholders, including institutional investors. According to the Korea 
Corporate Governance Service, as of the 1st half of 2014, 388 companies 
informed stakeholders of the convening of a shareholders’ meeting 16.3 days 
prior to the actual meeting, on average; for the 2nd half of 2013, 53 major 
financial companies provided information 18.4 days in advance. If business 
reports have to be submitted and disclosed prior to providing notice of the 
convening of a shareholders’ meeting, it is recommended that the deadline for 
providing notice of convocation must be increased to 4 weeks prior to the 
shareholders’ meeting in order to give ample time for investors to analyze 
agenda items. Even if the shareholder meeting date is prior to the business 
report submittal, the deadline for giving notice of convocation for listed 
companies must be adjusted to 4 weeks prior to the shareholders’ meeting so 
that at least the list of executive nominations can be disclosed in advance32. 
31 Song Min-Kyung, “Reinforced Disclosure for Improving Fundamentals of shareholders’ 
meeting”, CGS Report Vol. 3 No. 10 (2013.5), Korea Corporate Governance Service, 
2-7.
32 Song Min-Kyung, Reinforced Disclosure for Improving Fundamentals of shareholders’ 
meetings”, CGS Report Vol. 2 No. 18 (2012.10), Korea Corporate Governance Service, 
3-6.
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D. Expansion of Disclosure Regarding Shareholders’ Meeting Agenda Items 
This section is focused on issues related to the election and remuneration of 
executives. Sometimes companies omit the profiles of directors, audit members, 
and auditor candidates from the notice of convocation, which increases the 
workload of institutional investors who need to fully exercise their voting 
rights. Therefore, it must be legislated that the detailed past 10-year career 
history of executive candidates of listed companies be included in the notice 
of convocation. In this way, shareholders can fully review the profiles and 
qualities of candidates and cast votes in favor of or against specific candidates. 
Following the amended Capital Markets Act in May 2013, “remuneration and 
its detailed calculation of criteria and method of individual executives” for 
executives receiving at least KRW 5 million was added as an item to be included 
in the business report. However, the actual disclosed data indicates that very 
few companies specified remuneration calculation criteria or the procedure 
used for corporate executives and the details of remuneration in conformity 
with the shareholders right to know33.
E. Expansion of Disclosing Shareholder Meeting Outcomes 
Currently, when disclosing the outcomes of shareholders’ meetings, companies 
only mention whether the agenda item in question had been approved or not, 
without specifying the percentage of those in favor of the item. This means 
that there is no way to know how the opinions of attending shareholders 
were formed around the item, making it difficult for shareholders to consider 
the specific results and how to exercise their voting rights in the upcoming 
shareholders’ meetings. This style of reporting undermines the rights of 
shareholders who must be able to exercise their voting rights based on ample 
information and an understanding of agenda items. In order to address this 
problem, when disclosing the shareholders’ meeting results, the exact percentage 
of “in favor”, “against” and “abstention” votes for each agenda item must be 
mandatorily disclosed. In this way, an accurate counting of “for” or “against” 
votes will be encouraged, which had been haphazard in the past, and which 
can further promote the use of electronic voting. 
33 Song Min-Kyung, Yoon Jin-Soo, Jung Jae-Gyu, “Analysis on the Specification of 
Remuneration of Individual Executives in Business Reports”, BFL No. 65 (2014.5), 
Seoul National University Financial Law Center, 17-20. 
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Ⅳ. Conclusions
This paper focused on the current status and issues regarding significant issues 
that need to be reviewed in order to improve the corporate governance of 
listed companies in Korea. Of course, many other topics exist for further 
consideration; in particular, regarding the independence of outside directors, 
there are many criticisms as to whether outside directors are fully assuming their 
intended role of checking and balancing the management in an independent 
position. In today’s Boards, the role of outside director is crucial for the 
successful implementation of the overall functions of the Board, and this is 
determined by the core qualities required of outside directors: independence, 
professionalism, and responsibility. Among such qualities, when focusing on 
the checks and balances role of the Board, independence is the most 
important element. Yet, it seems difficult to find the right answer for securing 
such independence. The aforementioned partial mandatory introduction of a 
cumulative voting system and the separate election of Audit committee 
members are useful for securing the independence of outside directors. 
The enhanced qualification requirement regarding the independence of 
outside directors, additional measures to secure independence from the 
election process and the procedure for selecting outside directors, and 
reinforced roles of institutional investors in electing independent outside 
directors are other options that can be explored. A comprehensive study and 
concrete measures for improvement regarding these matters was not included 
in this paper, and are subject to further study. 
It is also important to once again reflect upon the ultimate goal of improving 
corporate governance: Why should corporate governance be improved, and 
why are some business groups collectively opposing the Commercial Code 
reform bill? As many are aware, improving corporate governance also 
promotes corporate transparency and induces responsible management, 
thereby enhancing corporate value while ensuring that the fruits are distributed 
fairly to all shareholders. This in turn encourages sustainable companies, which 
in a larger framework ultimately contribute to promoting sustainable national 
economic and social development. Today, some controlling shareholder 
management practices oppose the improvement of corporate governance, 
Jeong Jae-Kyu, Yang Chun-Seung
87
because they are accustomed to the existing practice of managing businesses 
and using corporate resources for their personal benefit, which is deeply mired in 
opportunism. At times, changes may also seem awkward, and may subsequently 
incur huge costs and unexpected difficulties, while the newly introduced 
systems take root. 
Moreover, some companies may continue to prosper while maintaining their 
status quo without having to improve their corporate governance. However, 
how much and until when would such companies continue to flourish? In 
today’s world, seeking immediate, external growth is no longer supremely 
important; increasing in importance is for companies to seek sustainable 
development and achieve “good growth.” Good growth, which not only 
embraces shareholders, management, and employees of a company but also its 
consumers, competitors, partners, local community, and global environment, 
is needed. The first step and cornerstone in this journey is to improve 
corporate governance. 
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ESG disclosure: Legal requirement to facilitate 
CSR implementation by Korean companies
Kwak Kwan-Hoon
Ⅰ. Introduction 
The concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is gaining growing 
attention across the world, with CSR becoming a commonly used, familiar 
term. However, it is not easy to adopt a single definition of CSR, as it literally 
refers to the responsibility of a corporation vis-a-vis the society that it belongs 
to. Since social conditions differ between countries and periods, corporate 
responsibilities required by the society also take different forms, making it 
very difficult to ascertain what the actual definition of CSR is. However, when 
combining different conceptual definitions currently under discussion, CSR 
tends to refer to an act of considering not only financial performance but also 
diverse aspects linked to environment, human rights, and social, geographical 
and ethical aspects in business operations. For this reason, differences may 
exist between countries and regions since some may place more focus on 
human rights or environmental issues, or value donations more than others. 
Demand for CSR management has recently entered a new phase; with ISO 
26000, there are now on-going global efforts to standardize CSR practices. 
Although most guidelines are legally non-binding, it is important to note that 
there is an increasing trend to evaluate firms based on such guidelines, which 
have subsequently become de facto criteria for corporate evaluation. In other 
words, as firms with no CSR engagement are not appreciated in the market, 
CSR is no longer an option but is becoming a critical factor for ensuring 
business survival and sustainable growth. 
Following this international trend, there are also increasing efforts to legislate 
CSR in Korea. To date, there has been legislation passed requiring businesses 
to consider environmental and social aspects to ensure sustainable growth, 
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although without explicit mention of CSR. And although this legislation was 
not enacted for the purpose of CSR management, it did require that 
CSR-related elements such as environmental factors be taken into account. 
More recently, the enactment and amendment of laws directly requiring CSR 
business management is taking place. For example, the “Small and Medium 
Enterprises Promotion Act” was amended in 2012 to define socially responsible 
business operation requirements for small and medium enterprises. However, 
the Act holds limitations in that it only covers SMEs, though it is meaningful 
for being the first legation to directly define CSR practice by law. Furthermore, 
reform bills including the National Pension Act and Capital Market Act are 
being discussed, with the goal to further develop CSR management. 
Ⅱ. Background on CSR Legislation 
Discussions on both CSR and Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) are gaining 
momentum in Korea due to: (i) increasing social demand; (ii) increasing need 
for businesses risk management; and (iii) a paradigm shift in business regulations. 
1. Increasing Social Demand for CSR
Traditionally, the primary focus of a good firm was to manufacture inexpensive 
quality products, offer them to the market, and distribute profits to its stakeholders 
and shareholders. However, the growing perception today is that no matter 
how good the quality of a product, if environmental or human rights concerns 
are involved in the manufacturing process, the product will not benefit society 
as a whole. With mankind enjoying ever greater prosperity in the 21st century, 
the stakeholder’s expectations of firms have also expanded to include both 
financial as well as social and environmental values. Firms that merely pursue 
financial values and neglect social and environmental values will fail to earn 
social trust and will subsequently find its existence threatened. 
International norms and guidelines on CSR management have been proposed 
in attempts to meet such evolving demands for businesses, with major examples 
including “ISO 26000,” “UN PRI Principles,” and “UN Guiding Principles 
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on Business and Human Rights.” As more businesses are evaluated based on 
these criteria, the need for CSR implementation will also further increase. 
2. Increasing Need for Business Risk Management 
As there is an ongoing change in how society tends to view firms, there is a 
corresponding need for CSR management, from a business risk management 
perspective. A business stakeholder not only asks firms to generate more financial 
profits but also to assume social responsibility, and tends to proactively respond 
to companies who fail to do so. IT development plays a key role in this sense. 
IT technologies such as the Internet enable rapid sharing of information and 
helps international groups take a collective action through websites and social 
media. Today, firms in breach of regulations at times can find their existence 
threatened due to social criticism and boycotts from civil groups, even before 
facing any criminal or administrative sanctions. 
When stakeholders including consumers and civic groups take proactive 
measures to respond to firms, they may call for a higher standard of social 
requirements than legal ones. For example, when the level of harmful substances 
in a product is below a legal threshold, it does not pose any legal problems. 
However, consumers may complain about the fact the harmful substance was 
included into the product in the first place, and in this case, the company may 
face social criticism as well as financial loss. This explains the growing need to 
fully incorporate environmental concerns, human rights, and social elements 
at the corporate risk management level. Thus, in today’s world, CSR is holding 
an ever greater significance since it no longer simply concerns corporate 
philanthropy at a moral or ethical level but as a risk management concern for 
sustainable corporate growth. 
3. Paradigm Shift in Business Regulations 
Administrative bodies impose diverse legal obligations on companies to attain 
their stated goals. However, when companies fail to voluntary perform their 
obligations, these administrative goals cannot be achieved. As a result, the 
administrative body arranges a wide-range of sanctions as a means to secure the 
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effectiveness of its administrative intentions to have the obligations fulfilled or 
realize the same state of duties being performed. Sanctions on businesses include 
(i) administrative sanctions; (ii) criminal sanctions; and (iii) civil sanctions. 
These sanctions primarily aim to restrain the non-compliance of firms. Imposing 
strong sanctions on companies engaged in malpractice helps prevent the same 
malpractice from recurring both in the current firm as well as others. However, 
there are limitations to deterring malpractice through stringent sanctions when 
the firm is not committed to complying with the law.
For example, the most powerful regulatory means such as administrative 
punishment has limitations in restraining business malpractice. Administrative 
punishments have the greatest impact because the disadvantages are the greatest 
(e.g., the non-complying firm faces administrative punishment and is left with 
a criminal record), thereby maximizing the psychological effect. This explains 
why administrative punishment is the preferred sanction despite the subsidiary 
principles stipulated in criminal law. However, one limitation is that it is 
difficult to expect the same kind of psychological effect in corporate entities, 
as is the case for individuals. In particular, if an employee’s malpractice was for 
corporate profit, even though the actor faces criminal punishment, the company 
is likely to name his successor and continue to commit the same malpractice. 
In this case, there is often no criticism or sanction taking place within the 
organization, making it more difficult to restrain such malpractice from recurring 
by leveraging the psychological effect. 
For this reason, since current sanctions are structured such that they are 
relatively ineffective for restraining corporate malpractice, a fundamental 
paradigm shift in business regulations is needed. The implementation of CSR 
by bushiness is thus very important as a regulatory paradigm shift. That is, 
when businesses are encouraged to implement CSR, they will also build on 
their own system and either prevent or avoid potential legal misconduct. In 
this way, it will be possible to engage businesses to initiate voluntary compliance 
of laws and prevention of malpractice. In other words, CSR implementation is 
an advanced regulatory paradigm compared to the existing reactive sanction-
centered regulations. 
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Ⅲ. Development of Legislation Relevant to CSR
1. Overview of Current Legislation 
Current legislation that directly regulates CSR is the “Small and Medium 
Enterprises Promotion Act.” Other legislation does not directly regulate 
CSR, but tends to indirectly regulate CSR’s individual elements, such as 
environmental and social aspects.
(1) Small and Medium Enterprises Promotion Act 
Following its amendment in 2012, the Small and Medium Enterprises Promotion 
Act stipulates requirements with regards to the “corporate social responsibility 
of small and medium enterprises.” This Act states that SMEs shall make efforts 
to undertake socially responsible business operations vis-a-vis its employees, 
suppliers, customers and the local community (Article 62.4.1). Furthermore, it 
also stipulates that the government and local self-governing bodies can provide 
necessary support for the socially responsible business operations of SMEs 
(Article 62.4.2).
This Act targets SMEs and requires the Small and Medium Business Administration 
(SMBA) to take necessary measures and provide support for facilitating CSR 
implementation. In particular, the SMBA Administrator shall establish and 
implement a basic plan to promote CSR-implementing SMEs every five years 
with a goal to facilitate CSR implementation by SMEs and provide systematic 
support (Article 62.5.1). The basic plan shall include: 1) the basic policy 
goals and objectives for facilitating the promotion of CSR implementation 
by SMEs; 2) an action plan for promoting CSR management by SMEs; 3) 
assistance programs for CSR implementing SMEs; 4) the current status of 
CSR implementing SMEs; and 5) other items prescribed by the Presidential 
Decree for facilitating and supporting CSR implementing SMEs (Article 62.5.2). 
In this case, the items under the Presidential Decree refer to: a) the training 
and development of CSR professionals; b) CSR business management training 
for SME employees; c) the development and diffusion of implementation 
indicators for CSR management by SMEs; and d) other major initiatives 
relevant to facilitating CSR implementing SMEs (enforcement ordinance 
Article 54.3).
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Furthermore, an annual execution plan built on the basic plan must be implemented 
(Article 62.5.3), and the requirements of this plan must be determined under 
the Presidential Decree (Article 62.5.4).
Moreover, the SMBA Administrator can designate an SME support agency or 
group to effectively assist the socially responsible business management by 
SMEs (Article 62.6.1). Pursuant to this regulation, the SMBA designated the 
“Korea Productivity Center” as the “CSR Small and Medium Business Center,” 
which first began activities in April 2014. A center or group must fulfill the 
following requirements to be designated as a CSR Small and Medium Business 
Center: 1) be a non-profit organization; 2) have a specialized team dedicated to 
supporting the CSR practice of SMEs; 3) include consulting or a training 
program in the scope of the institution or group’s activities; and 4) the total 
space of the training facilities shall be above 150 m2, with one or more training 
and consulting rooms (enforcement ordinance Article 54.5.1). A center or 
group fulfilling such requirements should attach supporting documents and 
submit its application to the SMBA Administrator (Article 54.5.2). 
The CSR Small and Medium Business Center must 1) provide guidelines 
regarding CSR implementation by SMEs; 2) nurture a professional workforce 
in terms of CSR implementation by SMEs; 3) provide training and education 
to raise awareness of CSR; and 4) provide necessary information and consulting 
assistance regarding CSR (Article 62.6.2). The SMBA Administrator may invest 
in or grant a loan to support the costs required for the operation of the Center 
(Article 62.6.4), and in the case that the legal requirements for designation are 
not met, the designation can be canceled (Article 62.6.5).
(2) Other Legislation Indirectly Regulating CSR
A. Industrial Development Act
The “Industrial Development Act” was enacted in 1999 and aims to facilitate 
the modernization of industrial structures, such as strengthening industrial 
competitiveness, enhancing the efficiency of industrial organization, and 
facilitating corporate restructuring. This Act is meaningful for being the first 
to introduce the concept of “sustainable development” in Korean legislation. 
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Sustainable development, first introduced in the environmental sector, has 
now expanded to include social and political aspects. Thus, the concept of 
“sustainable development” was presented under the view that it is no longer 
possible for businesses to ensure sustainable growth while neglecting 
environmental or social issues. Although this Act does not directly regulate 
CSR, it clearly underscores the importance of environmental and social aspects 
in CSR implementation for businesses, and defines the roles and responsibilities 
to be assumed by the government or local self-governing bodies to this end. 
B. Sustainable Development Act
Furthering the concept of sustainable Development that was introduced in 
the Industrial Development Act (1999), the “Sustainable Development Act” 
was legislated in 2007 to put this concept into more concrete terms. This Act 
defines sustainable development as “development based on sustainability that 
is implemented simultaneously in the pursuit of economic growth, social 
stability, integration, and the preservation of the environment” (Article 2.2). 
This Act provides the basic attitude and strategy to be adopted by the 
government and local self-governing bodies to ensure sustainable development 
from an environmental perspective (from Article 7 to Article 11), and includes 
a sustainability evaluation (Article 13) and sustainable reporting requirements 
(Article 14). Sustainability reporting refers to disclosing data on the efforts 
made by a firm to protect the environment, and it is deemed to have encouraged 
businesses to fully consider the environmental aspect. 
C. Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth
Among the environmental aspects of corporations, the “Framework Act on 
Low Carbon, Green Growth” was enacted in 2008 with the goal to lay the 
foundation for low carbon green growth by reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
The term “low carbon” refers to the intent to lower the dependence on fossil 
fuels, expand the use and distribution of clean energy, and reduce greenhouse 
gases to an appropriate or lower level by expanding carbon sinks (Article 2.1). 
Moreover, “green growth” refers to growth achieved by saving and using 
energy and resources efficiently to reduce climate change and damage to the 
environment, secure new growth engines through research and development 
of green technology, create new job opportunities, and achieve harmony 
between the economy and environment (Article 2.2).
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This Act defines the roles and responsibilities of the government and local 
self-governing bodies to ensure low carbon green growth while assigning 
certain duties for businesses. The government shall endeavor to promote the 
basic principles of low carbon discharge and green growth to be reflected in 
every aspect of government affairs (Article 4.1), and local self-governing 
bodies shall fully cooperate in the State’s measures (Article 5.1). In particular, 
each business entity, shall, in all its activities, observe green management, 
reduce emissions of greenhouse gasses and pollutants, and expand investment 
and employment in the research and development of green technologies 
and green industries to fulfill its social and ethical responsibilities for the 
environment (Article 6.1). Moreover, each business entity shall actively 
participate and cooperate in policies enforced by the government and each 
local self-governing body that promote low carbon discharge and green 
growth (Article 6.2).
In addition, the government is also required to arrange policies to facilitate 
and support the green economy and green industries. It especially needs to 
make a plan and green management promotion measures to transform existing 
industries into green industries (Article 23). To facilitate the green management 
of enterprises, the government shall establish and enforce measures that 
support and enforce measurers to provide technical support for conversion 
into environment-friendly management or disclosing the achievements of 
green management (Article 25).
As such, this Act defines the efforts for low carbon green growth as an 
important social responsibility of firms and proposes support measures for 
its implementation. 
D. Social Enterprise Promotion Act
A social enterprise aims to achieve the social goal of the organization. It does 
not operate business to maximize profits for the shareholders but uses its 
proceeds to achieve a social cause. Such social enterprises are now seeking a 
new paradigm shift, from pursuing social programs dependent on government 
subsidies or donations to a genuine social enterprise that seeks profits. The 
interest in social enterprises, which first began to grow in Europe, is now gaining 
momentum worldwide, and this interest continues to grow in Korea as well. 
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The “Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Act” was enacted in 2006, and 
according to this Act, an enterprise fulfilling specific qualifications is certified 
as being a social enterprise. A person who intends to operate a social enterprise 
shall satisfy the certification requirements and obtain certification from the 
Minister of Employment and Labor (Article 7). 
More specifically, a social enterprise is required to: 1) take the form of a 
corporation or an association under Civil Law; 2) employ paid workers; 3) 
primarily aim to realize social objectives; 4) have a decision-making structure 
that includes the participation of stakeholders; 5) have a certain level of 
revenue from operating activities; 6) have articles of incorporation, rules, etc.; 
7) spend at least two thirds of its revenue on social objectives; and 8) satisfy all 
other matters prescribed by the Presidential Decree (Article 8). Certified social 
enterprises pursuant to such criteria will benefit from a wide-range of support 
(from Articles 10 to 13).
Since the main goal of a social enterprise is to achieve a social cause, it 
essentially differs from the CSR management of a typical for-profit enterprise. 
However, it is significant that it presents a new model in which enterprises 
may move away from the conventional approach of solely pursuing profit and 
move towards pursuing both profit and public good. Moreover, some large 
corporations have begun to directly run social enterprises or implement 
corporate social responsibility by sponsoring social enterprises. Since these 
social enterprises can become a model for enabling CSR management by 
businesses, social enterprises and CSR management are closely related with 
one another. 
2. Reform Bills under Discussion 
(1) National Pension Act Reform Bill 
In August 2013, a “Reform Bill on the Partial Amendment to the National Pension 
Act” was submitted to the National Assembly (proposed by parliamentarian Lee 
Mok-Hee). This bill calls for the National Pension Fund to consider Environment, 
Social, and Governance (ESG) elements when selecting a firm to invest in. 
This yet-to-be passed bill is still under discussion in the National Assembly, 
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though it is significant in that it aims to legislate SRI to indirectly facilitate CSR 
implementation by businesses. 
The National Pension Fund of Korea is the world’s third largest pension fund, 
with a total asset of KRW 391.9677 trillion as of the end of 2012. Moreover, 
the investment-to-market capitalization ratio stands at 5.4%, making it the 
largest shareholder in the Korean Exchange; it plans to expand its investment 
ratio to 30% by 2017. If this trend continues, by 2020, the National Pension is 
expected to dominate 15% of the Korean Exchange Market. As such, the 
National Pension with its huge size has a considerable impact on the Korean 
exchange market as well as the companies it has invested in. Some believe that 
as a public fund pursuing the public good, the Fund needs to proactively purse 
socially responsible investing (SRI). This reform bill therefore aims to establish 
an institutional framework that allows the National Pension to incorporate 
such social needs and opt for more socially responsible investing in order to 
promote CSR implementation by businesses. 
In this reform bill, as the Minister of Health and Welfare is to manage and 
administer the National Pension Fund, social responsibility elements such as 
ESG elements must be considered. When making decisions based on ESG 
elements, the National Pension Fund Commission is required to disclose data 
regarding the consideration of each element and its extent. Moreover, in the 
case when ESG elements are not considered, the reason for non-consideration 
shall also be disclosed (Reform Bill Article 102.4). 
The reform bill does not directly mandate SRI in the National Pension 
management; rather, it takes an indirect disclosure approach. This approach 
is in line with the “Comply or Explain” scheme in the U.S. and Europe, which 
is often used as a means to regulate corporate governance. Since the biggest 
goal of the National Pension Fund is to secure the income for subscribers’ old 
age, its first and foremost priority should be to improve profitability. Therefore, 
it may seem inappropriate to make SRI mandatory at the expense of profit-
generation. Against this backdrop, SRI must be fully considered when making 
investment decisions; however, when deemed to undermine the investment 
return, the reason for non-consideration must be disclosed to ensure the 
autonomous management of the Fund. It should also be noted that the SRI of 
the National Pension Fund may come as a short-term burden to businesses. 
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(2) Capital Market Act Reform Bill 
In July 2013, the “Reform Bill on the Partial Amendment to Financial Investment 
Services and Capital Market Act” (hereinafter, “Capital Market Act”) was 
proposed (by parliamentarian Lee Eon-Joo). This bill is to include data relevant 
to CSR implementation efforts of businesses in the business reports that listed 
companies are required to submit. A similar reform bill had been proposed (by 
parliamentarian Park Sun-Sook) during the 18th National Assembly in 2010; 
however, this bill failed to pass, and it was revised and proposed again during 
the 19th National Assembly. 
This reform bill mandates business reporting firms to include corporate 
social responsibly implementation efforts in their business reports in order 
to assist investors in their decision-making process and facilitate voluntary 
CSR implementation efforts by bushiness, thereby creating a win-win social 
environment. The additional information required in the business report is as 
follows: 
1. Working conditions (wage, working hours). 
2. Labor-management relations (agreement with the labor union based on 
collective bargaining rights). 
3. Number of senior managers and employees (including part-time, temporary 
workers), training hours per employee, and representation of women in 
senior management).
4. Support for family and work balance of employees (in-house nursery, 
maternity leave, and reduced working hours for child rearing). 
5. Working environment including safety conditions and safety regulations. 
6. Environment-friendly business practices to reduce environment pollution 
and environmental damage caused by business activities.
7. CSR implementation vis-a-vis companies deemed to be de facto dominating 
the legal, contractual, and transactional relations.
8. Planning and implementation efforts with regards to consumer safety and 
data protection, consumer complaints, and dispute settlement procedures. 
9. Ethical management (whistle blower protection for in-house malpractice, 
and anti-bribery and corruption measures).
10. History of administrative measures or criminal punishment due to non-
compliance of laws prescribed by the Presidential Decree relevant to fair 
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trade, finance, labor, environment, and anti-corruption laws.
11. Community participation and development (social philanthropy and 
employment of local workforce).
There are numerous examples of legislation that require listed companies to 
disclose CSR data. In countries like the U.K., France, and Germany, it is legally 
required that companies disclose non-financial data regarding environment, 
working conditions, benefits, and profitable activities with the community 
together with the financial data. Such disclosure is meaningful in that it lays the 
institutional framework to help investors make informed decisions and 
provide transparent data for stakeholders. Moreover, this reform bill is also 
important from a business perspective because while preparing for the 
disclosure of data, companies themselves may become more motivated to 
adopt CSR business practices. 
(3) Government Procurement Act Reform Bill 
Besides the aforementioned National Pension Act and Capital Market Act 
reform bills proposed to the National Assembly, there is a growing need to 
reform the “Government Procurement Act.” Although the bill is yet to be 
submitted to the National Assembly, a detailed amendment of the bill is under 
preparation, and is likely to be submitted to the National Assembly soon. 
This Act requires the government to purchase with priority the products 
manufactured by companies fully engaging in ESG elements in order to 
facilitate voluntary CSR implementation by businesses. For example, the 
“Government Procurement Act Reform Bill” currently under discussion 
proposes, in part, to create a new provision that incorporates social and 
environmental values such as the environment, human rights, employment, 
fair trade, and consumer protection in the government procurement process. 
Moreover, measures are being sought to give priority to businesses who amply 
consider ESG elements in the “Act on Contracts to Which the State is a Party” 
and the “Act on Contracts to Which a Local Governments is a Party.”
The approach of giving priority or incentives to businesses meeting certain 
requirements is also commonly found in other existing laws. For example, the 
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“Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth” mandates public institutions 
to purchase green products to facilitate the development of green technology 
and green industries (Article 32.2). Moreover, the “Act on the Facilitation of 
the Purchase of Small and Medium Enterprise-Manufactured Products and 
Support for Development of Their Markets” stipulates that for the government 
procurement process, the government must sign procurement deals first with 
small and medium enterprises in order to facilitate SME protections (Article 
4.2). The Act uses the government procurement system as a means to attract 
the voluntary participation of businesses in a way that would benefit the nation 
as a whole. 
The reform bill currently under discussion also can be understood from such 
a perspective. If the government takes the initiative to make it a priority to use 
the products and services of businesses implementing CSR management, 
businesses will more voluntarily commit to CSR implementation. 
Ⅳ. Business Environment Changes and Response Following Law 
Amendment
1. Change in Business Environment
The National Pension Act and the Capital Market Act reform bills have had 
the greatest impact of all the aforementioned Korean laws in terms of CSR. 
Both Acts mandate businesses to actively disclose CSR related data. This 
disclosure of information is a preventive regulatory paradigm in that firms 
actively notify their situation to investors or stakeholders, and in the process 
work to identify problems and to take preventive measures to avoid potential 
problems. The following section will deal with the expected outcomes of these 
legislation reforms. 
(1) National Pension Fund Reform 
When the National Pension Fund is amended, the Fund will allow the National 
Pension Fund to consider ESG elements when selecting firms for investment. 
Moreover, if the Fund factors in ESG elements, it should disclose the details 
for consideration; if it does not consider ESG elements, it should also disclose 
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the reason for non-consideration. Therefore, the National Pension Fund, 
when selecting firms for investment, must not only analyze and review their 
financial data but also the non-financial data pertaining to environmental, 
social, and human rights issues. 
Given the importance of the National Pension Fund in Korea’s exchange 
market, it is expected that such change will have a huge impact on businesses 
as a whole. Going forward, businesses should not only consider operating 
profits but also make sure that legal malpractice during the Fund management 
does not happen. Moreover, businesses should also work to mitigate potential 
environmental, human rights, or labor issues. In this way, businesses will 
actively lead CSR management on their own. 
As mentioned above, it is very difficult to eliminate business malpractice, even 
by applying very stringent reactive sanctions. In particular, in large firms with 
tens of thousands of employees, reactive sanctions are far from effective; it is 
more important to ensure that companies build and manage an internal 
control system on their own to avoid potential problems. As such, if the 
National Pension Fund evaluates firms while considering ESG elements, 
companies must work to ensure the effective functioning of the internal 
control system. In other words, a company without an effective internal 
control system or without full engagement of ESG factors is likely to be 
eliminated from the market when such information is disclosed. 
(2) Capital Market Act Reform 
When a firm’s ESG information becomes available in a business report 
following the Capital Market Act Reform, the expected changes are: 1) the 
adjustment of the enterprise market evaluation criteria, and 2) the increased 
legal risks of enterprises. 
Information disclosed on business reports has long been an important criterion 
for investors when evaluating a company. The focus of existing reports has been 
on the disclosure of financial data, with most investors evaluating companies 
based solely on this data. However, when ESG elements are disclosed together 
with the legal amendment, investors can also make investment decisions by 
taking non-financial elements into account. 
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In particular, recent cases have reported that investors not only consider 
investment return but also pursue investments and public good through 
“crowd funding.” There is also a growing number of consumers who are 
willing to make “good consumption” by purchasing eco-friendly, human rights-
friendly products at higher prices. Moreover, businesses are learning by 
experience that if they decide to only care about investment return, though 
short-term gains may be great the long-term losses may be greater. Therefore, 
an increasing number of investors no longer merely consider the financial data 
when choosing an investment option. In this respect, when enterprises’ ESG 
information is fully disclosed, the decision-making criteria for investors will 
change accordingly. 
The second expected outcome pertains to increased business management 
and legal risks. In the past, firms faced no particular issue when meeting the 
minimum legal requirements. For example, in the case an environment law 
bans the use of pollutants higher than a certain level, firms only had to meet 
the minimum requirement provided in the law and would face no problem. 
However, with the Capital Market Act reform and the reinforced disclosure of 
ESG, firms are likely to set and practice a higher level of requirements than set 
by law in order to enhance their corporate image. 
With ever fiercer business competition, firms that fail to run its business as 
eco-friendly as their competitors will eventually be eliminated from the market. 
As a result, since a higher level of environment requirements are needed than 
exists by law, the legal risks of businesses are also likely to grow. That is, the 
level of ESG considered by businesses will also become an important criterion 
for corporate evaluations. 
(3) Government Procurement Act Reform 
When incorporating ESG factors into government procurement processes, it 
is expected that bushiness ESG considerations will directly correlate with their 
operating profit. In particular, the fact that a firm supplied its product to the 
government can also greatly impact consumer trust, thus serving as a matter of 
survival for the firm in question. It also allows for more direct regulation 
rather than indirect regulation through information disclosure; if the reform 
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bill is passed, ESG consideration and CSR implementation by businesses will 
become inevitable. 
2. Corporate Response Measures
(1) Management Decisions Considering Stakeholders
In most cases, senior management takes priority in maximizing profits for 
its shareholders. This is how a company is typically structured, and how 
commercial laws are generally set forth obligations vis-a-vis shareholders. 
However, society demands that the interests of both the shareholders and 
stakeholders such as consumers, employees, suppliers, the local community 
be considered. For example, the National Pension Fund, due to its nature of 
pursuing public good, tends to exercise its voting rights by considering the 
interests of various stakeholders together with the shareholders. That is, when 
corporate management makes shareholder-centered decisions, these decisions 
can be in conflict with the perspectives of institutional investors such as the 
National Pension Fund, which takes the interests of different stakeholders 
into account. In this aspect, once the National Pension Fund or the Capital 
Market Act reform bills are passed, it is highly likely that not only the National 
Pension Fund but also many other institutional investors will consider CSR 
management as important criteria for management decisions. 
In order to respond to such a changing environment, when management 
makes business decisions, it should consider the interests of its shareholders 
as well as other stakeholders. That is, it should prevent unnecessary conflicts 
with not only the major and minor shareholders but also stakeholders including 
consumers, the local community, employees, and partner companies and also 
seek collaborative ways to promote synergy between all. 
(2) Strengthening the Internal Control System 
As mentioned above, when the National Pension Fund Act and the Capital 
Market Act are amended, it will be mandatory disclose the ESG information 
of a firm to the market. Therefore, when a company faces a certain problem, 
it will be disclosed to the market without delay, thus impacting the company. 
In this environment, both investors and shareholders are expected to take 
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proactive measures to respond to such problems. Therefore, going forward, 
problem prevention will be viewed as having primary imp, and as a concrete 
measure, the adequate establishment and management of an international 
control system is required. 
To prevent the occurrence of problems during business management, an 
internal control system is needed. To run businesses that fully engage ESG 
factors, companies are required to look for environment issues or risks, or 
social or human rights problems in advance. Moreover, it is necessary to build 
a system capable of confirming the full compliance of ESG elements at each 
management step. In this regard, building an internal control system is indeed 
of crucial importance. 
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Does South Korea need Corporate Social 
Responsibility? The Impact of CSR on 
National Competitiveness
Simon Childs
In recent years, the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has enjoyed 
increased attention by managers, academics, consumers, NGOs, and policymakers 
alike, thereby reflecting the advent of a new business paradigm that highlights 
the need to develop frameworks for ensuring socially and environmentally 
sustainable growth1. In this vein, Bhattacharya and Sen report that more than 
80% of the Fortune 500 companies already address CSR issues and regularly 
communicate the extent of their social engagement.2 This development may 
indicate that the concept of CSR has become not only an ethical but also an 
economic standard in today’s business practice.3 4 From a managerial perspective, 
the basic assumption is that investment in CSR engagements serves to attain a 
company’s economic goals.5 6 7 8 The underlying rationale suggests that there 
1 Van Marrewijk, M. (2003). Concepts and Definitions of CSR and Corporate Sustainability: 
Between Agency and Communion. Journal of Business Ethics, 44, 95-103.
2 Bhattacharya, C.B., & Sen, S. (2004). Doing Better at Doing Good: When, why, and 
how consumers respond to corporate social initiatives. California Management Review, 
47(1), 9-24.
3 Carroll, A.B. (1999). Corporate Social Responsibility Evolution of a Definitional 
Construct. Business & Society, 38(3), 268-295.
4 Freeman, R.E. (1988). A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation. Perspectives 
in Business Ethics, 144.
5 Aupperle, K.E., Carroll, A. B., & Hatfield, J.D. (1985). An Empirical Examination of 
the Relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and Profitability. Academy of 
Management Journal, 28(2), 446-463.
6 Luo, X., & Bhattacharya, C.B. (2009). The Debate over Doing Good: Corporate 
Social Performance, Strategic Marketing Levers, and Firm-Idiosyncratic Risk. Journal 
of Marketing, 73, 198-213.
7 McGuire, J.B., Sundgren, A., & Schneeweis, T. (1988). Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Firm Financial Performance. Academy of Management Journal, 31(4), 854-872.
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is a relationship between CSR engagement and the competitiveness of firms. 
For example, Turban and Greening argue that a reputation for a strong corporate 
social performance positively relates to an organization’s ability to attract 
valuable human resources, which in turn constitutes a competitive advantage 
over competitors in the labor market.9 And Porter and Kramer posit that 
corporate philanthropy provides a competitive advantage because strategic 
donations help to improve the competitive context of a company, e.g., through 
the improved availability of natural resources or productivity due to the 
attraction of skilled workers.10
The bulk of these studies conceptualize the relationship between CSR and 
competitiveness at the microeconomic firm level. However, little under-
standing exists as to whether CSR has further implications for improving the 
competitiveness of a society and/or an entire nation at the macroeconomic 
level.11 12 This lack of data is surprising given the fact that politicians and 
policymakers increasingly turn to political measures to foster CSR deployment, 
such as the European Commission’s late Europe 2020 strategy for smart, 
sustainable, and inclusive growth.13 
Indeed, these proposals are seemingly put forth without a sound understanding 
of the relationship between CSR and the competitiveness of a nation; the 
European Commission admittedly states that “the principal focus is on how 
CSR might contribute to competitiveness at the level of the individual 
8 Varadarajan, P. R., & Menon, A. (1988). Cause-Related Marketing: A Coalignment of 
Marketing Strategy and Corporate Philanthropy. Journal of Marketing (3), 55-78.
9 Turban, D.B., & Greening, D.W. (1997). Corporate Social Performance and Organizational 
Attractiveness to Prospective Employees. Academy of Management Journal, 40(3), 658-672.
10 Porter, M.E., & Kramer, M.R. (2002). The Competitive Advantage of Corporate 
Philanthropy. Harvard Business Review, 80(12), 56-69.
11 Boulouta, I., & Pitelis, C.N. (2014). Who Needs CSR? The Impact of Corporate Social 
Responsibility on National Competitiveness. Journal of Business Ethics, 119(3), 349-364.
12 MacGillivray, A., Begley, P., & Zadek, S. (2007). The State of Responsible Competitiveness 
2007. London: AccountAbility.
13 EC. (2011). COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS: A renewed EU 
strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility COM(2011) 681 final.
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enterprise. The links between CSR and macro-level competitiveness are also 
explored, although there has been comparatively little research at this level of 
analysis”.14 Therefore, in order to address the politically sensitive question as 
to whether firms should be politically, or even legally, encouraged to engage in 
CSR practices and thus direct political and bureaucratic resources to such 
endeavors, an empirically tested conceptualization of the relationship between 
the aggregated level of national CSR performance and national competitiveness 
appears to be urgently required. This is especially the case for South Korea: 
while there have been a few conceptual models derived from datasets focusing 
on European countries presented15, there is no similar study that reports on 
data obtained from a South Korean sample. This research gap, however, 
conflicts with recent developments in the political agenda of South Korea’s 
economic policy debates: CSR has been widely discussed among Korean 
practitioners, policymakers, and NGOs. In addition, German political foundations, 
with the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation (KAS) standing at the forefront, have 
made significant efforts to engage the involved parties in a scientifically and 
politically rigorous debate, one which may ultimately foster CSR in South 
Korea.16 This engagement by the KAS reflects the strong interest held by 
South Korean leaders in understanding the feasibility of implementing CSR-
related standards into current economic policies.
Accordingly, this study seeks to answer the following question: does CSR affect 
the national competitiveness of South Korea? In order to answer this question, 
a conceptualized link between CSR and national competitiveness is proposed 
here based on literature in economics, strategic management, and CSR. Then, 
an empirical analysis is presented by drawing upon a sample of 20 leading South 
Korean companies in terms of their CSR engagements. This analysis subsequently 
contributes to the existing body of literature by proposing a conceptual model 
that links CSR and competitiveness by exclusively focusing on South Korean. 
14 EC. (2008). European Competitiveness Report 2008, p.106. Luxembourg.
15 Boulouta, I., & Pitelis, C.N. (2014). Who Needs CSR? The Impact of Corporate Social 
Responsibility on National Competitiveness. Journal of Business Ethics, 119(3), 349-364.
16 The Korea Office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation has been collaborating with 
academics, NGOs, and policymakers to bring forward the debate about CSR in South 
Korea for years. As a result, an extensive body of publications as and conference 
contributions exists today. 
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To conclude, the practical value offered by this study is then deemed relevant 
for those engaged in the numerous political and legal discussions pertaining to 
the question as to whether CSR is capable of contributing to South Korea’s 
competitiveness by providing a feasible rationale to politically foster its enactment.
Conceptual Framework
Conceptualizing Corporate Social Responsibility
The concept of CSR has long been the object of academic discussions. An 
intense debate pertaining to the question whether a company’s responsibilities 
stretch beyond profit making and maximizing shareholder value began when 
economist Howard Bowen, widely regarded as the first scholar to discuss a 
company’s responsibilities, stated that the obligation of a businessman was “to 
pursue those policies, to make those decisions, or to follow those lines of 
action which are desirable in terms of the objectives and values of our 
society.”17 A major critic of this claim was Milton Friedman, who prominently 
asserted that a firm’s (social) responsibilities do not “go beyond serving the 
interest of their stockholders or their members.”18 19 As a result of the process 
of discussing CSR, numerous definitions, concepts, and theories related to 
CSR thinking have emerged.20 In this vein, Carroll stated that “for a definition 
of social responsibility to fully address the entire range of obligations business 
has to society, it must embody the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary 
categories of business performance.21 In addition, by proclaiming that companies 
should accept their role as corporate citizens, Carroll further proposed a four-
dimensional pyramid that incorporates economic responsibilities as a building 
block on which the other three layers are built, including: legal responsibilities 
17 Bowen, H.R. (1953). Social Responsibilities of the Businessman, 6: Harper & Brothers.
18 Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and Freedom: University of Chicago Press.
19 Friedman, M., & Friedman, R. D. (2002). Capitalism and freedom (40th anniversary 
ed.), 133. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
20 Dahlsrud, Alexander. (2008). How corporate social responsibility is defined: an analysis 
of 37 definitions. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, 15(1), 1-13.
21 Carroll, A.B. (1979). A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance, 
499. Academy of Management Review, 4, 497-505.
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(“to obey the law”), ethical responsibilities (“do what is right, just, and fair, and 
to avoid or minimize harm to stakeholders”), and philanthropic responsibilities 
(“to contribute financial and human resources to the community and to 
improve the quality of life”).22 
A similar concept was introduced by Freeman, who embraced the main tenet 
of CSR thinking — that companies have responsibilities that go beyond the 
legal and economic argument to solely pursue the interests of its shareholders. 
Instead, he argued that socially responsible firms not only take into account 
their shareholders, but also consider their stakeholders. Accordingly, to 
answer the questions “in whose interest and for whose benefit the modern 
corporation should be governed”23, Freeman laid out a conceptual framework 
that explicitly recognizes the importance of managing relationships both with 
a firm’s shareholders and with stakeholders including employees, financiers, 
customers, employees, and communities. As such, stakeholders have been 
defined as: “persons or groups with legitimate interests in procedural and/or 
substantive aspects of corporate activity (and) are identified by their interests 
in the corporation, whether the corporation has any corresponding functional 
interest in them”24; “those groups who have a stake in or claim on the firm 
[…], including suppliers, customers, employees, stockholders, and the local 
community, as well as management in its role as agent for these”25; “groups 
and individuals […] each with (a) the power to affect the firm’s performance 
and/or (b) a stake in the firm’s performance”26; and “persons or groups that 
have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation and its activities, 
past, present, or future”, where primary stakeholders continuously participate 
in the corporation’s operations and essential for its survival (e.g. shareholders, 
investors, or employees, or the public), and secondary stakeholders who 
22 Carroll, A.B. (1991). The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the 
Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders, 42. Business Horizons, 39-48.
23 Freeman, R.E. (1988). A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation, 39. 
Perspectives in Business Ethics, 144.
24 Donaldson, T., & Preston, L.E. (1995). The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: 
Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 67. Academy of Management Review, 20(1), 65-91.
25 Freeman, R.E. (1988). A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation, 39. Perspectives in 
Business Ethics, 144.
26 Jones, T.M. (1995). Instrumental Stakeholder Theory: A Synthesis of Ethics and 
Economics, 407. Academy of Management Review, 20(2).
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“influence, affect, or are influenced or affected, by the corporation”(e.g., 
media or special interest groups)27. In order to advance stakeholder theory, 
Donaldson and Preston pointed out important distinctions of stakeholder 
concepts by formulating four central theses, reflecting distinct approaches 
towards stakeholder theory.28 First, they posited that stakeholder theory is 
descriptive, serving to align models of a modern corporation and its actual state. 
Second, they argue that stakeholder theory is instrumental for establishing and 
examining relationships between stakeholder management practices and 
corporate performance. Third, they argue that stakeholder theory is normative, 
serving to align an ethical framework that seeks to reconcile various stakeholders 
with legitimate interests in the corporate activities. Fourth, they argue that 
stakeholder theory is managerial, as it serves to derive recommendations 
regarding attitudes, structures, and practices that originate from cause-effect 
relationship predictions. In line with the instrumental/strategic view of CSR, 
i.e., benefits for both business and society, Hopkins explicitly posits that the 
aim of CSR at the macro-level should be “to create higher and higher standards 
of living while preserving the profitability of the corporation, for people both 
within and outside the corporation.”29
In addition to CSR definitions that emphasize the firm-view at the micro-level, 
there are definitions that emphasize the aim of CSR at the macro-level. The 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development defines CSR as “a 
continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to 
economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce 
and their families as well as of the local community and society at large.”30 The 
German Government follows the definition of the European Commission 
and defines CSR as a system of “companies, organizations and institutions 
that voluntarily assume social responsibility — above and beyond their legal 
obligations […] whereby companies integrate social and environmental 
27 Clarkson, M.B.E. (1995). A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating 
Corporate Social Performance, 106-107. Academy of Management Review, 20(1), 92-117.
28 Donaldson, T., & Preston, L.E. (1995). The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, 
Evidence, and Implications, 67. Academy of Management Review, 20(1), 65-91.
29 Hopkins, M. (2003). The Planetary Bargain - CSR matters, 1. Earthscan: London
30 http://www.wbcsd.org/work-program/business-role/previous-work/corporate 
-social-responsibility.aspx (06-01-2014)
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concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis”.31
All these definitions include the common suggestion that CSR refers to 
businesses assuming and fulfilling responsibilities that go beyond mere 
profit-making, with the aim to enhance social objectives, such as sustainable 
economic development, quality of life, and increasing the national standard of 
living, amongst many others. In this study, and in line with the above broad 
definition of CSR, the impact of CSR at the national level is tested.
Conceptualizing Competitiveness
The concept of competitiveness originates from the analysis of firms, and is 
used at the national level to evaluate the effectiveness of economic policies. 
The World Economic Forum (WEF) defines competitiveness as “the set of 
institutions, policies and factors that determine the level of productivity of a 
country”32. According to Krugman, the growth rate of domestic productivity 
equals the growth rate of national living standards.33 Similarly, the European 
Commission has defined competitiveness at the macro-economic level as “a 
sustained rise in the standards of living”34. Aiginger notices a convergence 
towards a core definition as “the ability of a country or location to create 
welfare”35. This broad definition of competitiveness contains an “outcome 
evaluation” of competitiveness (e.g., welfare or social safety) that can be 
measured by indicators such as per capita income, Human Development 
Index, or happiness.
In line with the above definitions of competitiveness, this study focuses on 
31 Federal-Ministry-of-Labour-and-Social-Affairs. (2014). CSR in Germany. Retrieved 
13.06.2014, from http://www.csr-in-deutschland.de/en/about-csr/what-is-csr.html
32 Schwab, K. (Ed.). (2009). The global competitiveness report 2009-2010, p.4. Geneva: 
World Economic Forum.
33 Krugman, P. (1994): Does third world growth hurt first world prosperity? Harvard 
Business Review.
34 EC. (2008). European Competitiveness Report 2008, 15. Luxembourg.
35 Aiginger, K. (2006). Competitiveness: From a dangerous obsession to a welfare creating 
ability with positive externalities, 161. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 6, 161-177.
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national living standards, as measured by per capita GDP at purchasing 
power parities. Despite the fact that this is only one among many possible 
measures of competitiveness, the ready availability of data pertaining to the 
GDP per capita (GDPC) has led us to use this measure as a proxy for national 
competitiveness. In addition, the GDPC reflects the aggregate productivity of a 
country, which constitutes a measure often deployed by prominent researchers 
such as Krugman36 and Porter37.
The relationship between CSR and Competitiveness
The majority of CSR-related studies have focused on the relationship between 
CSR and business competitiveness. Within this research stream it has been 
argued that firms engage in “strategic” CSR38 39, which may result in higher 
levels of financial and social performance.40 More specifically, it has been 
suggested that CSR has a positive effect on a firm’s competitiveness, as 
evidenced by factors such as by reduced costs41, value creation through new 
market entries42 43, fostering human resource performance and helping attract 
new talent44 45, building better relations with employees, customers, suppliers, 
36 Krugman, P. (1994). Competitiveness, a dangerous obsession. Foreign Affairs, 73, 28-44.
37 Porter, M.E. (1990). The competitive advantage of nations. Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Press.
38 Baron, D.P. (2001). Private politics, corporate social responsibility, and integrated 
strategy. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 10(1), 7-45.
39 McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. (2001). Corporate Social Responsibility: A Theory 
of the Firm Perspective. Academy of Management Review, 26(1), 117-127.
39 McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. (2001). Corporate Social Responsibility: A Theory of the Firm 
Perspective. Academy of Management Review, 26(1), 117-127.
40 Husted, B., & de Jesus Salazar, J. (2006). Taking Friedman seriously: Maximising 
profit and social performance. Journal of Management Studies, 43, 75-91.
41 Jenkins, H. (2006). Small business champions for corporate social responsibility. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 67, 241-256.
42 Porter, M.E., & Kramer, M.R. (2002). The Competitive Advantage of Corporate 
Philanthropy. Harvard Business Review, 80(12), 56-69.
43 Pralahad, C. K. (2004). Fortune at the bottom of the pyramid: Eradicating poverty 
through profits. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Wharton School Publishing.
44 Cochran, P. L. (2007). The evolution of corporate social responsibility. Business 
Horizons, 50, 449-454.
45 Turban, D.B., & Greening, D.W. (1997). Corporate Social Performance and Organizational 
Simon Childs
117
and communities46, and lastly, by improving corporate reputation, which may 
be rewarded by stock market investors.47
In order to scale the impact of CSR engagement from the firm- to the macro-
level, it has been suggested to align CSR with national competitiveness goals, 
hence embedding it into the wider economy. For this purpose, MacGillivray et 
al. coined the term “responsible competitiveness,” which they define as “an 
economy’s productivity being enhanced by businesses taking explicit account 
of their social, economic, and environmental performance”.48 The concept of 
embedding CSR into the wider economy was also supported by the European 
Union (EU). The European Commission has theoretically examined the 
impact of CSR on national competitiveness, and has subsequently suggested a 
positive link, mainly through to indirect impact on competitiveness factors 
such as social capital, innovation, and human capital.49
Following this line of argument, the research hypothesis of this study can be 
formally stated as follows: the higher the levels of South Korea’s aggregate 
level of firm CSR, the higher South Korea’s national competitiveness.
Empirical Analysis
Sample
To measure CSR, performance data were obtained from RobecoSAM, S&P 
Dow Jones Indices, and the Korea Productivity Center, which in cooperation 
composed the Dow Jones Sustainability Index Korea (DJSIK) based on its 
annual Corporate Sustainability Assessment. The Index is based on economic, 
Attractiveness to Prospective Employees. Academy of Management Journal, 40(3), 658-672.
46 Sen, S., & Bhattacharya, C. B. (2001). Does doing good always lead to doing better? 
Consumer reactions to corporate social responsibility. Journal of Marketing Research, 
38(2), 225-244.
47 Brown, B. (1998). Do stock market investors reward companies with reputations for 
social performance? Corporate Reputation Review, 1(3), 271-280.
48 MacGillivray, A., Begley, P., & Zadek, S. (2007). The State of Responsible Competitiveness 
2007, 13. London: AccountAbility.
49 EC. (2008). European Competitiveness Report 2008. Luxembourg.
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environmental, and social components and includes the top 30% of the 200 
largest South Korean Companies in the S&P Global Broad Market IndexSM. 
Macroeconomic data were obtained from various online databases (Table 1). 
Because the DJSIK was launched in 2009, the observations were analyzed on 
a quarterly basis from 2009 to 2013, resulting in a total of 20 observations.
Measures
National Competitiveness: The dependent variable, national competitiveness, 
was measured using GDP per capita (GDPC), which is a widely deployed 
measure used in economic performance analyses. However, because GDPC 
data were not available on a quarterly basis, this measure was constructed by 
dividing the quarterly GDP statistics by the annual population data obtained 
from databases provided by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance and Korea 
Statistics (KOSTAT).
Corporate Social Responsibility Performance: The independent variable, an 
aggregate of the national Corporate Social Responsibility Performance, was 
measured using the DJSIK. This metric is widely adopted in CSR-related 
studies and is thus considered a valid measure for the proposed model. The 
DJSIK seeks to capture the CSR performance of leading Korean companies in 
terms of their social, economic, and environmental performance. Because 
DJSIK scores were not available on a quarterly basis, averages were calculated 
for each quarter from Quarter 1 2009 through Quarter 4 2013, based on the 
daily DJSIK data.
Innovation and Cost Advantage: In order to control for extraneous effects, 
the control variables of Innovation and Cost Advantage were included in 
the model following the procedures established by Boulouta and Pitelis.50 
Innovation was measured in terms of the number of registered patents per 
quarter, using data obtained from the Korean Intellectual Property Service 
(KISPO). In turn, the control variable Cost Advantage was measured based 
50 Boulouta, I., & Pitelis, C.N. (2014). Who Needs CSR? The Impact of Corporate 
Social Responsibility on National Competitiveness. Journal of Business Ethics, 119(3), 
349-364.
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on the Unit Labor Cost Index, as published on a quarterly basis by the Bank of 
Korea. Both measures are considered robust, as they are frequently used in 
similar studies to measure Innovation and Unit Cost economies.
Methodology & Results
For the data analysis, the following regression model was applied:
, i =1,…, N
where Yit is the dependent variable, measured in per capita GDP (Yi), X1 
represents the independent variable CSR Performance, and β1 its respective 
regression coefficient. The control variable Innovation is represented by X2, 
with β2 as its respective regression coefficient. Likewise, X3 and β3 represent 
the control variable Cost advantage and its regression coefficient; the error 
term is represented by .
In order to test Hypothesis 1, the regression model was tested using tested 
using SPSS. The descriptive statistics and correlations are shown in Tables 1 
and 2, respectively. As shown in Table 3, a positive and significant correlation 
between national the CSR Performance and National Competitiveness (b = 
0.005, p = 0.001) was found, which in turn confirms the relationship predicted 
in the research hypothesis. In addition, only the control variable Innovation 
was found to be a significant predictor for National Competitiveness (p = 
0.001), whereas Cost Advantage did not display a significant effect on the 
dependent variable.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Deviation N
National Competitiveness 2.9575 .90419 20
CSR Performance 1457.0655 192.58697 20
Innovation 22498.3500 7952.45621 20
Cost Advantage 99.1350 24.99678 20
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Table 2: Correlations
National 
Competi-
tiveness
CSR
Performance Innovation
Cost 
Advantage
Pearson Correlation National Competitiveness 1.000 .887 .252 -.118
CSR Performance .887 1.000 .582 -.184
Innovation .252 .582 1.000 -.150
Cost Advantage -.118 -.184 -.150 1.000
Sig. (1-tailed) National Competitiveness . .000 .142 .311
CSR Performance .000 . .004 .218
Innovation .142 .004 . .264
Cost Advantage .311 .218 .264 .
N National Competitiveness 20 20 20 20
CSR Performance 20 20 20 20
Innovation 20 20 20 20
Cost Advantage 20 20 20 20
Table 3: Coefficients
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B
B Std. Error Beta
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
1 (Constant) -3.820 .706 -5.413 .000 -5.316 -2.324
CSR Performance .005 .000 1.124 11.065 .000 .004 .006
Innovation -4.520E-5 .000 -.398 -3.938 .001 .000 .000
Cost Advantage .001 .003 .030 .359 .724 -.005 .007
a. Dependent Variable: National Competitiveness
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Discussion and Limitations
The results suggest that the aggregated CSR performance of South Korean 
businesses can contribute to increased levels of national competitiveness. This 
finding is in line with studies that have previously conceptualized and tested the 
relationship between national CSR performance and national competitiveness, 
though which have mainly focused on Western countries.51 52
In terms of practical implications, the positive relationship between the aggregated 
CSR performance of Korean businesses and the national competitiveness of 
South Korea may be important for policy makers and political interest groups 
alike; from a political perspective it may seem appropriate to provide voters, 
legislature bodies, and business managers with a sound justification for any step 
taken towards coercive policies aimed to foster CSR among Korean businesses. 
Despite the fact that there has been a rising interest among Korean politicians 
and other stakeholders in discussing representative CSR case studies on both 
business and political levels, questions may remain whether copying a blueprint 
from Western countries presents a feasible solution for the Korean case, or 
whether such an endeavor would merely squander available resources (e.g., 
time resources, political resources, political agenda-setting, etc.). The findings 
presented in this study, however, do not confirm this scenario. On the contrary, 
given the perspective that South Korea’s national CSR performance positively 
impacts its national competitiveness, it appears feasible to take action towards 
implementing CSR-related economic policies to encourage firms to engage in 
CSR practices, thereby highlighting the importance to debate and learn about 
cases and experiences from countries that have a richer history of political CSR 
records. In line with the findings of this study, a political expansion of CSR 
concepts among and within South Korean firms may further increase Korea’s 
national competitiveness in the future.
51 Boulouta, I., & Pitelis, C.N. (2014). Who Needs CSR? The Impact of Corporate Social 
Responsibility on National Competitiveness. Journal of Business Ethics, 119(3), 
349-364.
52 MacGillivray, A., Begley, P., & Zadek, S. (2007). The State of Responsible Competitiveness 
2007. London: AccountAbility.
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Limitations of this study that may inspire further future research in order to 
improve validity, are as follows. First, the DJSIK data generally focus on the 
performance of a small sample of relatively big and profitable firms that already 
pursue sophisticated CSR. A larger sample of firms that include small- and 
medium-sized companies (SMEs) may increase the generalizability of results. 
In addition, the measure of national CSR performance does not reflect the 
level of CSR practices across the country. The results presented here are based 
on the impact of a few “CSR champions” in terms of national competitiveness. 
According to competitiveness literature, even the impact of single large companies 
on the economy as a whole can be significant. This is likely the case for South 
Korea, whose economy is dominated by only a handful of large conglomerates, 
locally referred to as chaebol (e.g., Samsung or Hyundai). Therefore, the impact of 
small-scale South Korean companies on national competitiveness as measured 
by GDP per capita could yield results different from those presented in this 
study. 
In line with these limitations, additional research should focus on 1) obtaining 
a larger sample of firms, including SMEs, and 2) deploy measures for national 
competitiveness that would improve consistency. Despite these limitations, 
this study contributes towards the critical question whether CSR has an impact 
on the South Korean economy as a whole. It provides support for the strategic 
view of CSR towards delivering a shared value for improving both business 
and society.
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Appendix
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Deviation N
National Competitiveness 2.9575 .90419 20
CSR Performance 1457.0655 192.58697 20
Innovation 22498.3500 7952.45621 20
Cost Advantage 99.1350 24.99678 20
Table 2: Correlations
National 
Competi-
tiveness
CSR
Performance Innovation
Cost 
Advantage
Pearson Correlation National Competitiveness 1.000 .887 .252 -.118
CSR Performance .887 1.000 .582 -.184
Innovation .252 .582 1.000 -.150
Cost Advantage -.118 -.184 -.150 1.000
Sig. (1-tailed) National Competitiveness . .000 .142 .311
CSR Performance .000 . .004 .218
Innovation .142 .004 . .264
Cost Advantage .311 .218 .264 .
N National Competitiveness 20 20 20 20
CSR Performance 20 20 20 20
Innovation 20 20 20 20
Cost Advantage 20 20 20 20
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Table 3: Coefficients
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B
B Std. Error Beta
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
1 (Constant) -3.820 .706 -5.413 .000 -5.316 -2.324
CSR Performance .005 .000 1.124 11.065 .000 .004 .006
Innovation -4.520E-5 .000 -.398 -3.938 .001 .000 .000
Cost Advantage .001 .003 .030 .359 .724 -.005 .007
a. Dependent Variable: National Competitiveness
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